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Acronyms 
ALPRO The Alliance for Progress. A U.S.-sponsored economic development aid program for 
Latin America established in 1961 under John F. Kennedy intended to preempt the spread of 
communist revolution. 
CORHABIT The 1936 Popular Housing Fund was one of Chile’s oldest housing related 
organizations.  When merged into CORVI in 1953, CORHABIT was relegated to gathering data 
more than financing homes. 
CORFO The Corporation of Production and Development, created in 1940 to assist recovery 
from the 1939 Chillán earthquake.  Used to stimulate development throughout the country more 
broadly. 
CORMU The Corporation of Urban Improvement, created in 1965.  The organization sponsored 
many of Santiago’s modernist projects in the 1970s. 
CORVI The Housing Corporation, was fashioned when CORHABIT was merged into the 
Urbanism Section in 1953.  The organization was under the guidance of Luis Muñoz Maluschka, 
disciple of Brunner.  
IADB The Inter-American Development Bank created in 1959 greatly augmented U.S. spending 
capabilities in the region. 
IA-ECOSOC The Inter-American Economic and Social Council, functioned to provide ALPRO 
aid recipients with technical advice, conduct detailed studies, and report back to U.S. offices. 
MINVU The Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, created in 1965 to keep up with Frei’s 
promises.  Consolidated other organizations like CORVI and CORHABIT.  Tasked to oversee 
planning and housing-related policy. 
 5 
 
MIR The Revolutionary Left Movement, a far-left group that opposed the Allende presidency.  
They organized several land invasions in the 1970s. 
PC Communist Party, established 1922. 
PDC The Christian Democratic Party, founded 1957.   
UP Popular Unity, the coalition of left groups that supported the election of Salvador Allende in 
1970. 
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Introduction 
 
Rural Chileans migrated to cities in droves from the late nineteenth century through the 
1970s, mostly to the capital of Santiago and the nearby major port of Valparaíso.  Economic 
dependence on copper and nitrates, an outdated, oligarchic class structure, the concentration of 
wealth in the agricultural realm, and natural disasters like earthquakes, prompted dislocation.  
Migrants transformed the nation from a largely rural society to a decidedly urban onefrom one 
third of the population living in cities in the early twentieth century to two thirds by the 1970s.  
Chile’s urbanization was one of the more rapid and extensive of all Latin America.  A Chilean 
preoccupation with housing the urban poor was rooted in this massive demographic shift, as poor 
rural migrants quickly overwhelmed available housing and infrastructure. 
The squatter and slum population, in large part jobless or partially employed women and 
their children, struggled to live in challenging if not outright dangerous environments.  Through 
local organizing efforts squatters and other poor urban strata succeeded in extracting policies and 
programs of immediate impact on their daily lives, such as affordable housing, and access to 
public utilities, space, health care, and other essentials.  The advocacy of the urban poor and 
those championing their struggle steered the entire nation in a progressive direction that resulted 
in a brief period of much-needed reform under presidents Eduardo Frei Montalva (Christian 
Democrat 1964-70) and Salvador Allende (Marxist 1970-73), before Pinochet’s nearly two 
decades of repression.  
A large progressive middle class and an organized working class developed in Chile 
alongside urbanization and modernization.  The interests of these contingents were increasingly 
reflected and represented in the establishment and growth of new parties and unions that also 
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consistently advanced a preoccupation with low-income housing throughout the twentieth 
century.  Housing was promoted as a universal right in Chile as early as the 1920s.   
However, while Chilean housing programs were ostensibly designed to assist lower 
sectors, they instead ended up disproportionately benefitting the middle sectors of society, even 
into the late 1960s.  Despite efforts to the contrary, this situation did not markedly change until 
Salvador Allende’s short three years in power.   
Chileans attacked housing shortages and rapidly growing slums with a combination of 
private and state-funded initiatives.  The result was an array of institutions that were private, 
public, or some hybrid of the two.  The creation in 1965 of MINVU (The Chilean Ministry of 
Housing and Urbanism) centralized and condensed most of the public institutions into one 
umbrella organization.  This gave the Frei and Allende administrations an unprecedented and 
efficient tool for producing and repairing homes, as well as planning neighborhoods and building 
public works and utilities. 
I hope in this thesis to shed light on how the intellectual trends within circles of technical 
experts influenced and substantiated prevailing public opinion and government policy regarding 
urban housing.  Chilean architects, planners, engineers, and other professionals were in continual 
dialogue with their European counterparts, dating back to the nineteenth century.  This provided 
for refined approaches to housing, planning, and construction that maintained pace with 
worldwide practices.  Although Chile was not visited by influential modernists like Le Corbusier 
and Josep Lluís Sert, Chileans selected their own set of foreign professionals to learn from, such 
as Austrian planner, Karl Brunner in the 1930s, who many perceive as having delayed the 
adoption of modernist approaches in Chile given his outspoken dislike of Le Corbusier.  
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Nonetheless, historical, economic, and political contexts aligned in a way that Chileans began to 
pioneer modernist approaches to housing shortages and were recognized for their efforts 
internationally.  By the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, colossal housing shortages in cities and lack of 
resources necessitated a turn to modernist principles of urban design and mass apartment blocks.  
Global advances in science and technology dictated that urban studies embody precision 
and professionalism, backed by concrete statistical figures.  In this spirit, constructing a new 
town or housing community was a complex procedure—one that normally required detailed 
demographic studies, surveys of the natural landscape, and the employment of considerable 
power and machinery.1  The involvement in projects of sociologists, anthropologists, developers, 
religious leaders, political leaders, geographers, and technicians of all stripes accompanied the 
coordination of architects, urban planners and engineers.  This history suggests that much is left 
to be discovered within the records left by these experts, as numerous and scattered as they are. 
This thesis is the product of weaving together information culled from available books 
and articles on these subjects with personal research done at the Chilean National Archives in 
Santiago and the Paul Lester Wiener Collection at the University of Oregon.  MINVU provided 
most primary source material used in this analysis.   
 
                                                     
1 Paul Lester Wiener Papers, Special Collections, the University of Oregon Library. 
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Chapter 1: Historiography of Urban Housing in Latin America 
 
 In the twentieth century, most of Latin America was characterized by urban centers 
swelling from influxes of poor rural migrants in search of economic opportunity.  English 
geographer Alan Gilbert was one of the first authors to theorize about the resulting housing 
shortages and the shantytown phenomenon.  Gilbert’s many studies were guided by the 
fundamental goal of understanding “… how the needs of the urban poor with respect to housing 
and servicing are articulated and satisfied.”2  Gilbert worked with survey teams that were 
deployed to major cities throughout Latin America with questionnaires.  The cities he studied 
differed in their historical contexts, political settings, timing of migrations, property relations, 
types of housing, etc.  Nevertheless, cities developed with “… almost identical suburbs, so that it 
is difficult to tell either the shanty towns or the high-income residential areas in one city from 
those in another.”  Describing the inescapable poverty that characterizes these cities in which 
“Traffic congestion, skyscrapers and street children are found everywhere,”3 Gilbert proposes 
that a shared struggle against mass poverty arose throughout Latin American cities.    
While the results of urban migration may have been similar throughout Latin America, 
migration to cities occurred at a dramatic rate in Chile that significantly outpaced its neighbors.  
This surge in urban population proved instrumental in shaping the physical development of 
                                                     
2 Alan Gilbert and Peter M. Ward, Housing, the state, and the poor: Policy and practice in three 
Latin American Cities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1. 
3 Alan Gilbert, The Latin American City (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 1. 
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Chile’s cities, as well as government policy on all levels.  Poor migrants new to Chile’s cities, in 
most cases accustomed to generations of living in isolated or remote areas and unfamiliar with 
the conventions of modern western finance and land ownership, encountered a lack of affordable 
dwellings, along with a complex bureaucratic process impeding access to scarcely available 
state-financed assistance.  Families took matters into their own hands, staking out large sections 
of vacant land and rapidly transforming them into mosaics of makeshift houses constructed out 
of whatever material was available.  The authorities tore the shacks down, but the poor 
relentlessly reconstructed new ones virtually overnight.   
 In Chile (in what reads as uniquely Chilean) an expansive vocabulary was employed to 
refer to shanties and slums: most famously poblaciones, inhabited by pobladores, but other terms 
for poor neighborhoods included callampas, ranchos, conventillos, cités, campamentos, and 
tomas.  These off-the-grid communities, out of the reaches of municipally provided paved 
streets, plumbing, and potable water, were viewed by officials and elite sectors of society (the 
church, policy makers, business owners, etc.) as hygienically hazardous moral disaster zones. 
The improvement of poor neighborhoods in Latin America hinged on successful 
grassroots efforts, as well as overcoming bureaucratic hurdles.  In Brodwyn Fischer’s A Poverty 
of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro, she illustrates that in 
Brazil enfranchisement entailed performing a host of duties that people were often unwilling or 
unable to comply with.4  Local organizing is no easy task, yet throughout Latin America groups 
of all kinds made their voices heard.  In Chile, this ranged from women’s groups, to football 
clubs, housing associations and homeless committees, unions, and the Communist Party. 
                                                     
4 Brodwyn Fischer, A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de 
Janeiro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 310. 
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Latin American social movements celebrated the entirety of the poor masses, not just 
those on the assembly lines.  Communists, radicals, progressives, and Christians assisted in 
navigating modern laws and programs, as well as in articulating the voice and needs of the 
informal and peasant populations.  There was a vague consensus among many in Latin America 
that the poor simply deserved more.  Both the impoverished citizens themselves and their 
proponents used the umbrella terms like “poor families,” “poor workers,” or the “urban poor” to 
identify a population that inhabited various occupations, homes, and neighborhoods.5  Fischer 
notes that despite the conventional leftist position on the lumpenproletariat (the informal and 
part-time workers outside the realm of mass industrialization, who unlike the factory worker, 
were not seen as central to the revolution), party members (capital C Communists) outspokenly 
promoted the rights of favela dwellers in the twentieth century.  The same can be said for Chile 
and the pobladores.   
Edward Murphy combines anthropological and historical methods in his book For a 
Proper Home: Housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile, 1960-2010.6  Murphy writes: “In 
mass-market, democratic societies, private property regimes have retained certain exclusive and 
hierarchical characteristics, forming much of the material ground upon which class distinctions 
develop.”  Murphy continues: “Such a foundation links individual comportment with spatial 
relations, the distribution of resources, and governance.  It has implications for ideas of both 
social standing and justice.  In the former instance, gaining access to property is about gaining a 
                                                     
5 They encompassed not just industrial workers and miners but “…washerwomen and domestic 
servants, street vendors and odd-jobbers, cobblers, tailors, and workers fallen into the ranks of 
the perennially unemployed,” Ibid., 3-4. 
6 Edward Murphy, For a Proper Home: housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile, 1960-
2010 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 26. 
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place in the social order.”7  Perceptions of space and home ownership were intrinsically linked to 
social hierarchies and enfranchisement, in what was a gendered and inherently violent process.  
Owning property proved the basic means of accessing the benefits of the centralized state, such 
that lack of ownership cemented many in the role of underclass citizens.  Murphy shows how the 
Chilean state imposed itself at the very doorsteps of the shanties, in the form of exclusion and 
outright threat.  Space, class, gender, and race were fundamentally interconnected in the slums of 
Santiago despite promises of equality and reform.   
Conservative segments of the population assumed, with some basis, that the slums were 
headquarters for radicals, and that the poor were susceptible to recruitment by them.  Civil 
discontent was associated with poor neighborhoods early in Chile’s urbanization, a reality that 
continued into the 1960s and 70s.  As far back as the 1940s and the Popular Front era, radicals 
and progressives of all stripes spoke up for the homeless and squatters and became active in their 
neighborhoods, and they were celebrated in return; in the 1960s this included folk singers like 
Violeta Parra,8 and organizers like Gladys Marín.9  By 1970 the poor suburbs surrounding 
Santiago became known as the “Red Belt,” and the neighborhood of San Miguel was known as 
“Red Country.”10  By the 1970s and 80s riot police would ritually storm into the shanties and 
attack protesters, who fiercely fought back.  Organizational efforts engaged in by radicals and 
                                                     
7 Ibid., 27. 
8 Murphy, For a Proper Home, 79. 
9 Ibid.; Margaret Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against 
Allende, 1964-1973 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 18; Cathy 
Lisa Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1995), 53. 
10 San Miguel was adjacent to the well-documented Yarur textile mill, see Peter Winn, The Yarur 
Workers and Chile’s Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 84. 
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progressives yielded real results for the shanty dwellers who in return committed themselves to 
the left.   
The Latin American history of housing, shantytowns, and the urban poor is necessarily 
interrelated with that of other spheres, for example, the history of public health, disease, and 
medicine.  Diseases, natural disasters and even the toll of war ripped through poor 
neighborhoods, both urban and rural, far too frequently inflicting the greatest tolls on those 
already suffering most.  In The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires, 
1870-1950, Diego Armus examines how disease grew to become associated with the Argentinian 
urban poor.  He writes of the tuberculosis public health program: “… it ended up, by the second 
quarter of the twentieth century, focusing on certain social groups, now defined by their 
occupation and place of residence rather than, as in the past, their lifestyles and presumed 
morality.”11  Being poor was synonymous with a hazardous, unhealthy, and disease-ridden 
existence, such that attempts to eradicate disease were overwhelmingly centered on city slums.  
Armus continues: “This process, like many others associated with the arrival and consolidation 
of a certain modernity, was bound up in consent and coercion, social imitation and learning, 
novelty and tradition.”12  State expansion and modernization in this instance sent public health 
and medical professionals to dwellings to help an often-unreceptive lower class.  Outdated 
sewage systems, lack of potable water, close quarters in multifamily homes where people lived 
side-by-side with farm animals—these were singled out as some of the most pressing unsanitary 
occurrences in poor neighborhoods. 
                                                     
11 Diego Armus, The Ailing City: Health, Tuberculosis, and Culture in Buenos Aires, 1870-1950 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 346. 
12 Ibid., 346. 
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Modernizing processes of all kinds—state and legal expansion, social programs, urban 
development, disease containment and control, construction of housing and infrastructure—
constituted a multifaceted force for change that bore down on the poorest residents of urban 
slums in Latin America.  Informal workers, the working class, agricultural laborers, and 
increasingly religious leaders, the middle class, and politicians, centered efforts on housing and 
the plethora of issues closely related to it.  Urban poverty was frequently treated as an 
emergency, even when it was not the result of natural disasters like earthquakes, or war 
displacement.  The crisis of urban poverty ultimately demanded state intervention, accompanied 
by significant foreign financial backing.  
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Chapter 2: Structures of Chilean Society  
Class, Economy, and Urbanization 
 
 The twentieth-century Chilean experience with slums is necessarily informed by Chile’s 
geography and socioeconomic development.  The narrow strip beyond the Andes was remote in 
colonial times.  The provincial capital of Santiago, founded in 1541 by Pedro de Valdivia, sat at 
the center of a region relegated to feeding the other parts of the Spanish empire.13  An elite group 
of Spanish immigrants exploited a small indigenous peasant population.  
 This dynamic did not drastically change with independence from Spain.  The latifundia 
system of large estates employing semi-peon laborers dominated Chilean agriculture in the 
nineteenth century, and lasted in rural regions well into the twentieth century.  By the end of the 
1930s, and despite various reform and redistribution efforts, most useful land remained in the 
hands of a few: between 1935 and 1936 an estimated tiny elite-owned 626 estates constituted 
57.73 percent of all arable land.14  Monteón notes that many of the families who controlled Chile 
in 1963 were related to those who sat atop the colony in 1800.15  The Larraín family, for 
example, epitomized these Spanish-descended aristocrats.16  The same can be said for Chilean 
cities, as “… in the early nineteenth century, the ruling clique in Santiago could not have 
included more than fifty or sixty families…”17  Zeitlin and Radcliff describe the ruling class as 
                                                     
13 Fernando Pérez Oyarzún and José Rosas Vera, “Cities within the City: Urban and 
Architectural Transfers in Santiago de Chile, 1840-1940,” in Planning Latin America’s Capital 
Cities, 1850-1950, ed. Arturo Almandoz (London: Routledge, 2002), 110. 
14 Thomas C. Wright, Landlords and Reform in Chile: The Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura, 
1919-1940 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 125, see Table 15. 
15 Michael Monteón, Chile and the Great Depression: The Politics of Underdevelopment, 1927-
1948 (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1998), 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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having indistinguishable economic and family interests.18  They were, in fact “… simultaneously 
‘capitalist’ and ‘landlord,’ [and] integrated into particular clusters of multiply intermarried 
propertied families…”19  This ruling elite maintained disproportionate control, as many Chilean 
political parties and organizations were essentially extensions of the ruling class. 
Most Chileans were part of the underclass of inquilinos, or tenant farmers.  Before the 
colossal migrations hit critical mass, these people had little economic opportunity or prospects of 
rising out of deep indebtedness to large landowners.  Rural folk were expected to grow their own 
food and extra wheat to sell and pay other expenses, as well as provide wheat for the landowner, 
though there was rarely enough land left over to make this feasible.  People worked in exchange 
for regalías (derived from the word gift), which included housing, food, a small plot of land, and 
other necessities provided by the old aristocratic families.  The inquilinos received some cash 
payment, but as late as the 1950s as much as 70 percent of their income was received as 
regalías.20  In something akin to sharecropping, the inquilinos owed the landowners a large 
portion of the crops produced on their farm.21  Furthermore, the small farmers were required to 
hire seasonal workers out of their own pockets.22  The market was already flooded with the 
product of the large landowners (also grown with the labor of the inquilinos) and cheaper 
imported goods, so the common farmers could not compete given their small operations.    
Chile may have been a frontier under Spanish control, but after independence the global 
market reflected international business interests.  The Chilean wheat industry produced massive 
                                                     
18 Maurice Zeitlin and Richard Earl Radcliff, Landlords & Capitalists: The Dominant Class of 
Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 7. 
19 Ibid., 9. 
20 Ibid., 21. 
21 Ibid., 22. 
22 Ibid., 22-23. 
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quantities to feed overseas nations like the U.S. and Australia.  Apart from agriculture, the pillars 
of the Chilean economy became the production and export of copper and nitrates (saltpeter),23  
industries that were predominantly foreign-owned.24  The wealth that was generated from the 
nitrates industry in its heyday reverberated throughout Chilean society, sparking unprecedented 
industry, commerce, migration, and construction.25  Copper remained economically paramount in 
Chile throughout most of the twentieth century; however, in an often-volatile world market the 
nation was destined to face insecurity when selling its major product, which eventually became 
overwhelmingly U.S.-controlled.  In contrast, however, the nitrate industry only sustained the 
nation into the beginning of the twentieth century, as it collapsed during the Great Depression.   
Chile’s urbanization patterns and its construction of infrastructure aligned with its 
geography and industries.  The nation’s elongated and narrow geography required that wealth 
and transportation be concentrated around the Central Valley.26  The nitrate era saw some export 
activity out of ports in the north, but for the most part all movement of natural resources, food, 
and products was slated for a circumscribed path that led first to Santiago, and then out the port 
                                                     
23 Nitrates were in demand on the international market not only for their value as a fertilizer, but 
also as a key component in munitions, see Michael Monteón, Chile in the Nitrate Era: The 
Evolution of Economic Dependence, 1880-1930 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1982), xii. 
24 The annexation of the Antofagasta region at the very northern tip of Chile, acquired with 
victory in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) fought against Peru and Bolivia, incorporated 
territory rich in nitrates, initiating the nitrate era.   
25 As DeShazo writes: “This development of industrialization, and infrastructure required 
manpower.  The country remained in a state of great demographic flux for the next fifty years, as 
agricultural workers of the Central Valley gravitated to the mining camps and ports of the North 
and to the fast-growing cities of Santiago and Valparaíso,” Peter DeShazo, Urban Workers and 
Labor Unions in Chile 1902-1927 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 3.   
26 Jon V. Kofas, The Sword of Damocles: U.S. Financial Hegemony in Colombia and Chile, 
1950-1970 (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 91.  
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of Valparaíso.27  The material conditions of the country and its geographical layout, the location 
of its economic foundations, the motives of owners, and the structure of Chilean society all 
suggested that a high rate of migration would inevitably yield an urban housing crisis.   
An itinerant labor force staffed the first railroads, mines, construction sites, and ports 
necessary for urbanization.  Many of the first urban migrants were these seasonal workers who 
floated from job to job, and who worked the labor-intensive phase of the wheat harvest.  They 
filled many careers that would gain influence as the century wore on, such as railcar operator or 
dockworker.  These laborers became the backbone of Chilean modernization and urbanization, as 
the floating seasonal workforce found opportunities at first in the mining boomtowns and ports, 
but increasingly primarily in the capital and Valparaíso.28   
Families and single men fled the mines at the northern end of the country and the 
beleaguered wheat farms in the thousands for the cities of the central region.29  The Santiago-
Valparaíso region became one of the only viable destinations for those seeking jobs.  The 
country’s transition from rural to urban in character was the result of these two cities’ booming 
population growth.  
                                                     
27 Valparaíso developed in parallel to the California Gold Rush, as before the building of the 
Panama Canal ships were forced to sail around the entire South American continent.  The port 
city often accommodated travelers from places like San Francisco, and in turn some U.S. 
architects and planners made their way south through this connection. 
28 Ibid.; DeShazo vividly describes how the rural workforce came to form the basis of the “peón-
gañán segment of the Chilean urban working class.”  He concludes: “A peón-gañán could move 
quickly from one task to another, from city to harvest to mine and back again.  As time passed, 
many took up more permanent work,” see DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 
5. 
29 For example, in August of 1914 South Pacific Mail reported 2,000 unemployed families 
flooded into the capital, most having fled the dying industry in the nitrate fields, see Walter, 
Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 60. 
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Table 2.1.  Population totals in and net migrations to Santiago and Valparaíso 
 
(Sources: Markos J. Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile: Demography and Labor Force, Volume 2; 
R. Paul Shaw, Land Tenure and the Rural Exodus in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru; Peter 
DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile.) 
 
Table 2.2.  Urbanization of Chile 
 
(Source: Mamalakis, Historical Statistics of Chile) 
 
Ranchos and Conventillos: Evolution of Chilean Shanties and Slum Tenements 
 
The first wave of migrants to Santiago crowded into makeshift shantytowns along the 
Mapocho River, initially dubbed ranchos.  The outskirts of Santiago became populated with 
women who carried with them their rural tendencies, combining domestic agriculture, cottage 
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industries, and small commerce out of their shacks to stay afloat on the edge of the city.30  Yet 
these women were consistently stigmatized for this industriousness.  Women and children were 
some of the earliest migrants to cities, as an underclass of women was necessary for urban 
lifethe aristocrats and developing middle class desired domestic workers, such as nannies and 
maids.31  The ranchos were the roots of the pobladores that would become famous by the 1960s 
and 70s.  To the elite these presented a repulsive juxtaposition to the grandiose beaux arts style 
of the city’s center, which they described using dreadful racist languagethe visible poverty, 
after all, clashed with the perceived sophistication of the central Alameda and the Mint.32  The 
rich and middle class wished to avoid embarrassment with European visitors, who were troubled 
by the normal homelessness, begging, and lack of open public space.33  Despite efforts to 
eradicate them, the shacks were a persistent city sight in the early decades of the twentieth 
century.  They extended up into the hills surrounding Valparaíso and circled downtown Santiago 
in nearly every direction but the northeast. 
                                                     
30 Elizabeth Quay Hutchinson, Labors Appropriate to Their Sex: Gender, Labor, and Politics in 
Urban Chile, 1900-1930 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 A smallpox outbreak had devastated Santiago’s conventillos (tenements) and arrabales (low-
income neighborhoods composed of Arab immigrants) in 1871, prompting the demolition of 
unsanitary dwellings and leaving their residents packing for the even further off-the-grid 
rancherías along the river.  The rich went as far as to label these people “barbaric African 
hordes,” see Murphy, For a Proper Home, 45 
33 A publication by Albert Masch in Geneva documented his trip to Santiago between 1904 and 
1906, where he witnessed 200,000 rotos or “broken ones” in the city slums, see Walter, Politics 
and Urban Growth in Santiago, 18. 
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Table 2.3.  Conventillos in Santiago 
 
(Sources: DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 57; González Arriagada, “Surviving in 
the City,” 87)  
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Conventillo as depicted by Karl Brunner in 1939 (Source: Karl Brunner, Manual de 
Urbanismo Volume 1 [New York: Routledge, 2016], 262) 
 
Conventillos, tenement style multi-family housing, offered only minimally improved 
living conditions to the ranchos.  Most of the conventillos were a residue of Santiago’s not-so-
distant agricultural past, repurposed buildings, such as grain warehouses and the like, typically 
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one or two-story buildings “…with a single door on the street opening into a square courtyard.”34  
Landlords used the shells of old structures and compartmentalized the buildings into apartments 
to maximize profit, without consideration for the safety or comfort of the residents.  Families 
would occupy their own small, dimly-lit room surrounding the courtyard, most lacking a 
window, as the window-equipped rooms facing the street commanded the highest rent.35  The 
conventillos were extremely susceptible to earthquakes, storms, and other natural disasters, as 
they were cheaply and haphazardly constructed.36  The rooms faced internally toward a 
communal courtyard, kitchen, and an open sewage canal that ran through the whole complex.  
This understandably became acknowledged as a serious health hazard.37  Conventillos also 
housed bakeries, storefronts, and farm animals.  The courtyards became centers of urban life, as 
the practices of rural living had to be adapted to fit in the new availability of space. 
                                                     
34 DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 59. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Hutchison, Labors Appropriate to Their Sex, 29. 
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Figure 2.2.  Aerial view of Santiago’s conventillos (Source: Brunner, Manual de Urbanismo, 60) 
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Figure 2.3.  Map of conventillos and cités in Santiago, 1910 (Source: DeShazo, Urban Workers 
and Labor Unions in Chile, 58) 
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Figure 2.4.  Map of conventillos 1900-1923 (Source: Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, Labors 
Appropriate to Their Sex: Gender, Labor, and Politics in Urban Chile, 1900-1930 [Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2001], 31) 
 
Early in the century large portions of Santiago were entirely composed of shacks, 
tenements, and other forms of cheap housing.  A 1915 article noted eighty blocks in the 
northwest section of the capital as being entirely composed of cités and conventillos.38  Cités—
two or three-room brick apartments clustered in small groupings around a corridor that opened to 
the street—were a step above conventillos and were often reserved for city clerks and 
                                                     
38 Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 83. 
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bureaucrats.39  Cités were unavailable to the poorest Chileans but were still demarcated as 
substandard.  
Table 2.4.  Demographic comparison of men and women in Santiago and in conventillos 
 
 
(Source: Hutchison, Labors Appropriate to Their Sex, 32, 25, see table 1) 
 
Santiago was a city of poor women and their children, who were the most common 
occupants of the repurposed conventillos.  Men, if employed, often resided in housing provided 
by employers.  Lucrative men’s occupations were backbreaking and conditions were hazardous, 
providing for an appalling mortality rate, and leaving many widows bound for the cheapest 
housing available.  Furthermore, many men arrived in the earlier migration waves described 
above.  As rural society further collapsed women and children fled the dire situation.  In 1925, 
the U.S. ambassador to Chile wrote to Washington disgusted by the conventillos, describing 
them as crowded 15 sq. ft. rooms that typically housed families of four, but often as high as eight 
individuals.40  The Labor Office estimated a density of about 65.4 people per building.41  People 
were sleeping side-by-side in tiny rooms stacked up for several floors.  Mothers and their 
children were forced to live near unfamiliar and even outright threatening men.  In 1918 the High 
Council on Housing ordered 1,319 conventillo rooms be torn down.42  Houses built by the 
                                                     
39 Ibid., 13. 
40 Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 13-14. 
41 Ibid; DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 57. 
42 Hutchison, Labors Appropriate to their Sex, 30. 
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Santiago Savings Fund in 1919 were meant to be affordable, but proved far out of reach of the 
budgets of their intended consumers, the poor.43   
Despite the visible abject poverty, by the 1920s the local authorities had formed a new, 
albeit unofficial stance on shanties that did not easily harmonize with the goals of professionals 
and policy makers—so long as the slums remained out of sight from the city center and other 
rich neighborhoods, their residents were left alone.  The poor took advantage and camped out in 
every nook, such as unoccupied corners between roads and rivers, though most concentrated just 
north of the Mapocho River.44  New arrivals from the nitrate fields, on the other hand, received 
government-provided shelters called albergues.45  State housing could not tackle the persistent 
stream of new arrivals from the north, and many displaced miners and their families did not 
manage to duck the slumlord-owned conventillos.  Nonetheless, the contrast in government 
assistance perpetuated a division between the informal part-time laborers with rural beginnings 
and the incoming miners, though the two groups might easily be neighbors sharing a wall or 
even a room within the same tenement.  From the viewpoint of most groups promoting 
industrialization and urbanization, workers displaced from the mines were expected to enter 
more worthwhile occupations and in turn fuel the economy.  
The Chilean urban population explosion necessitated expanded bureaucracies and distinct 
zones, so that tasks and funds could be divvied up.  In turn residents were abruptly confronted 
with new bureaucratic offices and complex laws.  1906 witnessed the division of Santiago into 
nineteen municipalities, which left many residents disconnected from city services and 
                                                     
43 DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 64. 
44 González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 21. 
45 Ibid., 22. 
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infrastructure.  Per the MINVU website, twenty-nine new poblaciones were created in the city in 
1925, and fourteen in other regions.46  The new neighborhoods of Santiago exploded in 
population, a large part of which can be attributed to rancho and conventillo residents.   
Table 2.5.  Growth of new municipalities of Santiago 
 
(Source: Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 74) 
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Santiago’s neighborhoods in 1938 (Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 
10) 
 
                                                     
46 “Historia del ministerio de urbanismo y vivienda.” 
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In the process of creating municipalities, poor residents were sold fake land titles by 
developers, giving them a false sense of security in “phantom subdivisions.”47  Homes were 
relegated to no-man’s-land, forgotten between adjacent official zones; most commonly these 
were the informal shacks and tents wedged up against a bridge or riverbank.  Horror stories were 
typical, as residents held onto titles for decades only to discover their paperwork was 
meaningless. 
 
Radicalization and Progressivism  
 
 Working-class Chileans developed an affinity for unionization and militant actions in the 
first few decades of the twentieth century, with much of the struggle rooted in overcrowding and 
lack of homes in urban centers.  In the early part of the century, strikes, protests, and outright 
violent conflict were a common sight in Chile’s major cities.  One of the most significant 
working class demonstrations took place in 1905 and was deemed “Red Week.”  Rising food 
prices and a cattle tax mobilized 30,000 to 50,000 people in Santiago to protest peacefully at 
first.  But this quickly broke down into two days of mob-led destruction and looting aimed at the 
wealthy and their property.  It proved to be the “…bloodiest uprising in the history of Santiago 
before 1973; over 300 persons were killed and at least 1,000 injured.48  Major strikes included 
the 1916 railway strike in Santiago, the 1917 general strike in Valparaíso, and the 1918 printing 
strike.49   
                                                     
47 Murphy, For a Proper Home, 55. 
48 Wright, Landowners and Reform in Chile, 103. 
49 DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 167. 
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In 1930s Santiago, students organized armed contingents and engaged in outright gun 
battles with the Chilean carabineros or police force.50  The civil unrest in the cities was 
overwhelmingly orchestrated by middle sectors, while the participants in the upheavals were 
more likely to be artisans, transportation workers, or students, not the homeless.51  Urbanization 
entailed pushes for equality and reform, a response to the tremendously concentrated wealth in 
the hands of the Chilean upper class.  Residents demanded attention from the government to their 
basic needs, and they often did so by taking to the streets.  Not surprisingly, demonstrations and 
clashes with the authorities inevitably extended to the issue of inadequate housing and poor 
housing conditions.  By 1925, after three years of renter strikes over conventillo conditions in 
both Valparaíso and Santiago—they mainly consisted of nitrate workers and their families who 
had been moved out of government-provided housing—tenant leagues sprang up throughout the 
cities.52  Even formally employed workers and middle-class segments of society were relegated 
to substandard homes and neighborhoods.  Accustomed to decades of experience voicing gripes 
and, if need be, organizing strikes and demonstrations, they naturally continued to put up a fight.  
While the city’s poor made their way south and north of downtown in search of 
affordable rent, those with enough money fled to the eastern suburbs, to neighborhoods that 
remain upper and middle class to this day, like Las Condes and Providencia.  A new bureaucracy 
and contingent of skilled professionals who made up an incipient middle class began to cohere 
within this group of better off urban dwellers.  They would be at the forefront of emerging efforts 
                                                     
50 Monteón, Chile and the Great Depression, 45-46. 
51 See Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A. 
52 González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 21. 
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to make city life possible.53  Meanwhile elite Chileans from cities and the countryside alike sent 
their children abroad or to the universities in Santiago and Valparaíso for education, which they 
attained living adjacent to the visible suffering of rapidly mushrooming inadequate housing.  
Concern, sympathy, and worry for the workers and underclass took hold among the younger 
members of these better off sectors of society as they were exposed to the deplorable living 
conditions of the urban poor.  In addition, these early members of the Chilean middle and 
bureaucratic classes also largely ascribed to a concept of a Chilean ‘people,’ a notion that, 
combined with a measure of patriotism or nationalism, shaped a concerted effort to assist the 
members of the “Chilean race”.  At a more self-interested level, moreover, emerging 
professionals were also motivated to address the misery of the poor to preempt that group’s 
radicalization and the emergence of civil unrest.   
Regardless of the exact motive, Chile’s middle class functioned to convince the unwilling 
aristocratic elite to permit reform, in what often amounted to a generational clash.  These 
professionals became engrossed in “…the ‘social question,’ or the problem of worsening living 
and working conditions in the country’s mining centers and major cities, especially Santiago and 
the port city of Valparaíso, and the associated proliferation of working-class radicalism.”54  From 
this perspective, the middle class was relatively successful in harnessing knowledge centers, 
negotiation, the press, and bureaucratic positions to promote their own causes, and in turn 
brought the social question to the table on the larger political stage. 55  Middle class elements 
turned Chile’s third major party, the Radical Party, towards a moderately center-left direction by 
                                                     
53 Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 145-146. 
54 Patrick Barr-Melej, Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the 
Middle Class (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 3. 
55 Ibid., 3-4. 
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the 1930’s.  As the middle class grew along with the demands of urbanization, reform became 
increasingly less taboo.  
 
Crisis 
 
By 1930 the economic situation in Chile had worsened tremendously with the Great 
Depression.  The lower and middle classes were devastated, but even the aristocratic-descended 
landlords and urban elite felt the repercussions.  The country had managed to amass $140.9 
million in debt by 1930.56  Wall Street canceled loans to the country in the wake of the 1929 
crash, starving its financial resources.  Monteón emphasizes the dire situation, writing: “Families 
roamed the countryside subsisting on wild greens.  The government put many of the unemployed 
in urban warehouses; even then, thousands remained homeless.”57  When Arturo Alessandri 
(1932-38) was reelected to a second stint as president of Chile he ran on a platform of economic 
nationalism with a semblance of populism, vowing to take the country out of economic crisis.  
Between 1933 and 1935, with an aim to reinvigorate the economy with jobs, the government 
offered a ten-year tax exemption for all new buildings.58  Policies of this sort yielded immediate 
results, as between 1932 and 1935 these incentive programs aided in reducing unemployment 
from an estimated 129,000 to 8,000.59  Given these tax breaks, it was considered safest to invest 
one’s money in real property, which presented a stable government-subsidized market.  
Alessandri resurrected the economy in a manner that not only impressed the elite, but also the 
                                                     
56 Kofas, The Sword of Damocles, 92. 
57 Monteón, Chile and the Great Depression, 24. 
58 Ibid., 119. 
59 Julio Faundez, Democratization, Development, and Legality: Chile, 1831-1973 (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 77. 
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lower ranks of the population.  It is not surprising that his policies fared well across the political 
spectrum. 
Yet despite their popularity, government policies recommending quick fixes to 
accommodate arriving migrants typically foundered.  A 1933 article in the publication WIKEN 
noted the government’s effort to channel the poor south of Santiago to other provinces while 
HOY suggested a “return to the land,” and that the unemployed should be provided with small 
agrarian plots.60   Chile passed a law that permitted the president of the republic to allocate poor 
families gold-bearing lands and established the Gold Panning Office.61  It was a failure.  The 
program dumped people in areas completely detached from infrastructure.62  Panning for gold 
was brutally exhaustive work, and while 400,000 people were transported to the gold sands in 
March, after the dreadful winter only 26,000 remained.63  Efforts like the gold scheme and the 
catchy rebranding of rural life are indicative of a shortsighted if not panicked response to social 
and economic malaise. 
Despite the problems associated with the Great Depression at the close of the 1920s, such 
as rising inflation and food prices, feverish construction booms characterized the early 1930s.  
However, this was unsustainable, as the faux economic growth was bound to falter without an 
industrial base to fuel it.  Santiago, and to a lesser extent Valparaíso, were struggling to house 
refugees from the failing nitrate fields, and in turn the cities saw an explosion in their slums, 
such as the ill-reputed conventillos.  Attempts to solve the housing shortages, address disease, 
                                                     
60 González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 54. 
61 The law-decree number 280 based on decree 248, see Ibid., 55. 
62 Ibid., 56. 
63 Ibid. 
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and recover from disaster would lead to a network of laws and institutions that would prove their 
worth in the subsequent decades. 
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Chapter 3: Urban Planning and Architecture  
Early Influences 
 
In the early twentieth century, Chilean architects were familiar with popular international 
trends like embryonic modernism, verticality, and the need for orderly planning based on the 
gathering of data.64  Indeed, Chileans had a long history of recruiting foreign architects and other 
professionals dating back to the mid-1800s.  Instructors came from places like Italy, France, 
Spain, and Germany to teach some of the first architecture courses and head some of the first 
architecture departments in the Latin American nations.65  This international exchange of 
expertise led by the 1920s to optimism in the fields of urban housing, hygiene, and planning, 
though solutions were hindered by a lack of resources and an inability to translate ideas into 
material actions to address the needs of the common poor.66  
                                                     
64 For example, in 1924 artist and writer Juan Emar published a review of Vers un architecture 
(Toward an Architecture) by Le Corbusier (Charles-Édouard Jeanneret), which had first come 
out the previous year and had been introduced to him by architect Vicente Huidobro, see 
Fernando Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile,” in Latin America in Construction: Architecture 1955-1980, 
ed. Barry Bergdoll, Carlos Eduardo Comas, Jorge Francisco Liernur, and Patricio del Real (New 
York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2015), 157.  
65 Chilean architects had primarily been trained in Europe, but in the mid-nineteenth century the 
country established one of the first professional architecture courses in Latin America.  The 
Universidad de Chile, founded in the 1840s, generated the Academy of Arts under Italian 
Alessandro Cicarelli in 1848, which housed a Curso de Arquitectura (1853) taught by Brunet, 
see Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 7; Pérez Oyarzún and Rosas Vera, “Cities 
Within the Cities,” in Planning Latin America’s Capital Cities, 111. 
66 As early as 1908 and 1909 Santiago hosted the First Pan-American Scientific Congress, 
covering issues such as sanitation, housing, and physical fitness.  Spanish planner Soria y Mata 
was invited to attend the conference but was unable to, instead asking Carlos Carvajal, Inspector 
General of Architecture in the Chilean Public Works Department, to stand in and present his 
writing “Rational City Planning as a Practical Solution to Low Cost Housing,” which adduced 
the atrocious infant mortality rates in Santiago—it was estimated two thirds of newborns died in 
their first year of life, see Collins, “Linear Planning Throughout the World, 83-85; Brenda Elsey, 
Citizens and Sportsmanship: Fútbol and Politics in Twentieth-Century Chile (Austin: The 
University of Texas Press, 2011), 35; see Appendix B: Names.  
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The rapid growth of cities and the prevalence of ranchos and coventillos resulted in the 
passage of a rash of housing laws early in the century.67  The series of laws encompassed the 
financial as well as physical aspects of construction.  These laws also addressed and assisted with 
repairs of apartments and houses.68  Laws of this period highlighted two main phenomena: 
“arrendamiento a piso” and “huerto obrero.”69  “Arrendamiento a piso” (roughly translated to 
“lease a floor”) referred to a housing option for a family with scarce resources who intended to 
further build a partially complete home as the family members saved up.  The “huertos obreros” 
(workers’ gardens or orchards), in contrast, were plots that were utilized as both home and 
income generators, through the establishment of small agriculture, industry, a market, etc.  These 
houses were erected “…in the middle of economic opportunities.”70  As Hidalgo Dattwyler 
writes: “In these conventillos there were people in coexistence with birds, pigs, horses, in 
addition to the fleas, bedbugs, cockroaches, and lice that they house.”71   
A 1935 law stipulated that the President could issue plots in the name of the Housing 
Department, designated as “las mejoras,” which referred to the above mentioned arrendamiento 
a piso, where the tenants would effectively improve their lot over time via self-help efforts or 
their own labor.72  Under this law the President regulated prices and guaranteed titles.  
“Compraventa de sitios a plazo” (trading of term sites), allowed people with faulty documents to 
                                                     
67 See Appendix C: Timeline of Housing Laws. 
68 Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edificación obrera,” 95, author’s 
translation. 
69 Ibid., 97-98. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 95, author’s translation. 
72 Ibid. 
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trade in for official papers.73  Through this law arrendamientos a piso were issued in 115 
different poblaciones.  Another 18,682 official leases on plots were allotted.74     
In total, between 1906 and 1925, housing laws, despite flaws, made a dent in the housing 
shortage: the laws of this early period resulted in demolishing 15,147 homes and constructing 
97,782.75  But these early approaches to housing overall favored the burgeoning middle class and 
ultimately amounted to a surface-level patch on a deep wound.  Around the time Santiago was 
being divided along neighborhood lines it also constructed its first public housing.  A series of 
fledgling programs constructed homes and neighborhoods, providing a foundation later for more 
impactful projects.  Santiago built its first two public housing projects in 1911: the Población 
Huemul south of the Alameda, and the Población Eugenio west of the Club Hípico (Polo Club).76   
The mass influx of desperate nitrate miners in the 1930s transformed the city, as the local 
government accelerated its construction of public works to meet pressing demands.  Oscar 
Prager, for example, designed the Parque Bustamante, also known as Gran Bretaña, in an 
Austrian style on land reclaimed from the river,77 while Guillermo Schneider produced housing 
complexes in the 1930s intended to replace the conventillos and citésthese included the 
TURRI and Plaza Blaquedano apartments.78  These projects however only housed a few hundred 
families.  They would characterize much of Chile’s experience in attempting to provide public 
                                                     
73 So long as bosses and landowners ensured rent was not more than 30 percent of tenant wages, 
the Housing Department gave tax breaks, see Ibid. 
74 Law 6630, see Ibid., 98-99 
75 Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edificación obrera,” 92. 
76 Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 14; Polo is a laborious game for men 
employed to constantly switch out exhausted horses and care for them, as owner/riders and their 
paid team go through multiple horses a person per match.  It can be assumed many people 
employed in the sport lived nearby. 
77 Eliash, “Santiago de Chile: Moderna a palos,” 9. 
78 Ibid., 10. 
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housing for the urban poor—often aspirational and well-meaning, but ultimately inadequate over 
time.   
The confidence placed in planners in this period by the government was impressive, 
though overly optimistic given the insufficiency of financial backing.  There were repeated failed 
attempts at implementing plans for Santiago in the 1920s and 30s modeled after European 
cities.79  Grandiose visions for the city were dreamed up, but in practice small-scale solutions 
proved more attainable and cost efficient. 
The city underwent significant additions and re-orderings, but this was at the expense of 
several rejected regional plan proposals.  In 1922 a plano de la manzana transformada 
materialized on land purchased next to the famous San Francisco Church.80  Manzanas are city 
blocks cut internally and usually diagonally by alleys and public spaces.81  Santiago acquired a 
European aesthetic and feel through its connections to Spanish and Austrian planners.  These 
internally cut units of buildings were intended to provide the charm of small streets and alleys; 
the manzanas also resembled the organically developed layout of conventillos, facing inward 
toward a central public space, now a street, alley, or park.82   
                                                     
79 In 1923, Alberto Schade produced a plan for the city in the style of the influential Austrian 
Camillo Sitte, see Arturo Almandoz, “From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin America, 1920-
1950,” Planning Perspectives 25, no. 1 (2010): 88, accessed March 6, 2015, 
doi:10.1080/02665430903515840. 
80 Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 120. 
81 The term manzana was borrowed from the Spanish planner Ildefonso Cérda’s design for 
Barcelona, see Alexander Doerr, “Behind Four Walls: Barcelona’s Last Utopia,” Failed 
Architecture January 15, 2014, accessed December 27, 2016, 
http://www.failedarchitecture.com/behind-four-walls-barcelonas-lost-utopia/.  
82 Perhaps the diagonal cuts into city blocks allowed the designers to mask the sight of poverty, 
as visitors most likely stuck to major streets.  Furthermore, people would be oriented toward a 
new, and hypothetically cleaner street to replace the old conventillo communal space. 
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Yet, slum conditions persisted and even worsened despite social programs and the 
dedication of professionals to their eradication.  In the late 1920s it was estimated that Chile had 
the highest infant mortality rate in all Latin America, as “…by 1928 one in four (as compared 
with one in three at the beginning of the century) live births in Santiago ended in death before the 
first year of life was completed.”83  In the same year renowned planner Carlos Carvajal 
concluded that 40 percent of Santiago, 192,000 people, lived in some 8,000 unsanitary 
buildings.84  “Unsanitary” was a blanket label for any homes that defied ideal standards, 
including features like dirty drinking water, open sewage, or lack of streetlights and pavement.  
Near the end of 1928, the Ministry of Interior required local governments to provide lighting and 
pavement for barrios populares, adding to the multifaceted effort to improve health and 
mortality rates that extended beyond the construction of homes.  Addressing the atrocious infant 
mortality rate necessitated this combination of solutions, improving each family’s individual 
household while simultaneously illuminating the sidewalk to create a safer walk home or 
educating people to refrain from sleeping near their livestock or dumping their dirty water out 
the window. 
Chileans used their familiarity with slums when engaging with other technical experts 
internationally, communicating their optimism about solving an intractable shortage.85  
Conferences held in Santiago invited architects and planners from throughout Latin America and 
the world to witness the progress made in solving the problem, as well as to contribute advice.  
                                                     
83 Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Santiago, 21. 
84 Ibid., 163. 
85 Cuartos redondos were slightly pricier than a typical conventillo room, as they were equipped 
with a window that faced out to the street, offering more sunlight and privacy, see Alejandro 
González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City: The Urban Poor of Santiago de Chile, 1930-1970,” 
(Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2000), 87. 
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For instance, the Pan-American Conferences on Architecture and Urbanism brought together 
professionals throughout the region to collaborate and debate.86  At the first of the congresses, 
held in Santiago in 1923, it was agreed that it was the “…’primordial duty’ of the state to provide 
citizens with cheap, healthy habitation.”87  Chilean architects took this ideal to heart and by 1923 
the Chilean Association of Architects was vocally committed to solving the housing crisis along 
the standards for minimum dwelling established at the Brussels CIAM conference.88  Six years 
later in 1929 the Public Works Department had committed to the “science of urbanismo,” a 
popular concept with visiting planners, embracing planning as a necessary component of any 
social housing or hygiene program.89  At times, it was even viewed as a panacea, as if a neat 
neighborhood alone could somehow inspire poor residents to pull themselves out of poverty 
without financial assistance or job opportunities.      
Natural disasters provoked changes in policy and drove Chileans into emergency relief 
efforts; for the poor, natural disasters equated to displacement, homelessness, and at times even 
lethal conditions due to a landlord skimping on safety or the limits of a self-built home.  
Earthquakes certainly quickened migrations.  Pressured into action, the Chilean government 
created a series of disaster relief measures and institutions that became useful tools in the 
struggle for housing.  The 1928 earthquake in Talca furthered burgeoning interest in codifying 
planning principals, as a 1931 law generated in the wake of the tragedy required that “…every 
                                                     
86 Pérez Oyarzún, Pérez de Arce, and Torrent, “Introduction,” in Chilean Modern Architecture 
since 1950, xii. 
87 Valerie Fraser, Building the New World: Studies in the Modern Architecture of Latin America 
1930-1960 (New York: Verso, 2000), 116. 
88 Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edificación obrera,” 94. 
89 Ibid. 
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city with a population over 20,000 must develop a General Transformation Plan.”90  The law also 
established national urban standards, for example, for the widths of streets and the heights of 
homes.91  The Central Board gestated by this law was rebranded in 1936 as the Popular Housing 
Fund or CORHABIT.  It offered housing loans with twenty-seven-year terms and initial 
payments on mortgages.92   
Displacement and homeless caused by earthquakes and the crash of industries, as well as 
urban crowding more generally, created an ideal context for the adoption of foreign models of 
planning and affordable housing.  Reconstruction of damaged regions and a slum crisis nurtured 
experimentation.  A Chilean affinity for city planning developed early in the twentieth century, 
and pieces of European schools of thought were sensibly adopted.  Linear Planning and 
urbanismo were incorporated into courses taught in Chilean universities, borrowing from 
Spaniard Arturo Soria y Mata and Austrian Camillo Sitte.93  Chileans were aware of the 
modernist movement—for example, upon graduating from the Universidad Católica in 1928, 
                                                     
90 “Historia del ministerio de urbanismo y vivienda;” This was the General Construction and 
Urbanization Law written by Luis Muñoz Maluschka, who would partake in many urban projects 
in the following decades and worked closely with the Austrian planner Karl Brunner, see Luis 
Valenzuela, “Mass housing and urbanization: on the road to modernization in Santiago, Chile, 
1930-1960,” Planning Perspectives 23, no. 3 (2008): 275-276, accessed March 12, 2015, 
doi:10.1080/02665430802102799. 
91 Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edificación obrera,” 96. 
92 “Historia del ministerio de urbanismo y vivienda.” 
93 In 1928 Alberto Schade Pohlenz taught a class on urbanismo at the School of Architecture of 
the University of Chile’s Faculty of Economic Sciences and Mathematics with a syllabus clearly 
influenced by Camillo Sitte, see Arturo Almandoz “From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin 
America,” Planning Perspectives 25, no. 1 (2010): 88, accessed March 6, 2015, 
doi:10.1080/02665430903514840; Arturo Almandoz, “Urban Planning and Historiography in 
Latin America,” Progress in Planning 65 (2006): 88, accessed March 6, 2015, 
doi:10.1016/j.progress.2006.02.002. 
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Sergio Larraín García-Moreno toured Europe, working with architects including Le Corbusier,94 
and in 1929 Larraín, who had returned to Santiago, with Jorge Arteaga designed the Oberpauer 
building in a distinctly Bauhaus aesthetic.95  That being said, in the 1930s and 40s Chilean 
planners took an alternative route to that of the modernists, instead looking to another Austrian 
for influence, Karl Brunner, possibly because professionals had already cultivated a deep 
admiration for and sense of comfort with planners like Sitte.96  Brunner’s impact on Chilean 
planning proved to be long lasting; his efforts primed the country to promote social housing over 
the next few decades. 
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Figure 3.1.  Oberpauer Building (Source: Fernando Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile,” Latin America in 
Construction 1955-1980 [New York: MoMa, 2015], 158) 
 
Karl Brunner, the Austrian Planner 
 
Karl Brunner von Lehenstein was officially invited by the Chilean president in 1929 to 
reconstruct post-earthquake Talcaat the height of urban migrations caused by the 
reverberations of the Great Depression. 97  Disaster and economic turmoil yielded innovation and 
a desire for order.  For Brunner, this was an opportunity to showcase the value of his techniques.  
In 1929 he published the influential Santiago de Chile: su Estado Actual y Futura Formación 
(Santiago de Chile: A Study for Future Expansion).98  Brunner stayed in Santiago until 1932 and 
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returned in 1934,99 working with Chilean notables who would carry on his legacy long after his 
departure.100  His ideas were categorically influential in Chilean urban planning, including in 
dealing with the ever-present problem of housing the poor.  In Brunner’s vision for Santiago, the 
hygienic crisis in the conventillos could only be solved through a thought-out response to 
population growth.  The task of planners was to craft a set of standardized policies and orderly 
infrastructure and plots to receive and guide urban newcomers.  To an extent his ideas 
corroborated and continued many of the practices that were already in play within Chile.   
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Karl Brunner in 1931 (Source: Höffer, “El origen de la metrópolis,” 1) 
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 Brunner famously held a bitter dislike for the work of Le Corbusier, but shared common 
threads with the modernists and other schools of planning.  On October 29th and November 14th, 
1929, Brunner outlined his urban planning theories in a series of lectures at the Universidad de 
Chile, titled “Problemas actuales de urbanizacion” (Current Problems of Urbanization).  
Brunner began by explaining that town planning in its modern incarnation required consideration 
for both the aesthetic and the scientific.  Urbanismo focused on three components necessary to 
planning cities: first a human element, meaning culture, social hygiene, and economic and 
political contexts; second, a technical engineering aspect; and third, an artistic component.101  All 
three parts required equal attention.   
Brunner called for something akin to zoning, what he called “a separation of sectors” 
each designated for business, public buildings, residences, industry, etc.  Each of these sectors 
were to be “…separated from the other through open spaces with vegetation, spaces that must 
connect the city centre with the countryside.”102  He described what was essentially a circular or 
radial city: “The city’s central nucleus… is encircled by residential barrios surrounded by strips 
of gardens and parks…”103 Brunner suggested the widening of streets and the preservation of 
public monuments and historic buildings.104  One can note the parallels, whether it be to Le 
Corbusier’s call for green space, or the Garden City Movement’s and Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
desire to marry town and country.  Brunner’s thoughts on green space, preservation of historic 
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charm, zoning, and especially hygienic precautions all meshed well with the Chilean experience 
with planning and neighborhood development up to this point, and was adopted without protest. 
 Brunner employed examples of Austrian and German cities to communicate his ideas on 
social housing and verticality to the Spanish-speaking audience that was consuming his planning 
guide.  He professed of Vienna: “It is a recognized fact that the way housing is built for the mass 
is an essential element for the general aspect of the city.”105  Brunner acknowledged the unique 
political context in the city of Vienna—that of a socialist majority in the municipality—and that 
its public housing could be irrelevant to other cities like Santiago.106  He particularly took issue 
with the height of Viennese apartments: “All the skyscrapers of the Vienna Municipality lack 
lifts so dwellers every day have to go up and down the seven or nine floors afoot…”107 Brunner 
pointed to a “two-thousand housing-unit project” he was commissioned to do in that city, and to 
lessons learned from his experience.  He admitted the large buildings made possible a great range 
of apartment sizes and layouts, and that in turn he could experiment with methods of providing 
natural light.108  However, Brunner maintained that this taller and wider building design did not 
work well in the Chilean context. 
 German cities, in Brunner’s view, provided better models for Chile and other Latin 
American countries.  The guarantee of public green space, curvilinear streets, shorter buildings, 
and more sunlight made the German model more applicable to the dire housing situation in 
Chile.  He observed: “Exemplars of new style working-class housing are to be found in German 
cities where entire districts have been subject to uniform planning and are provided with wide 
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meadows between the building blocks.”109  The apartments he had in mind were about two to 
four stories tall.  The Chilean situation resembled that in Germany, in that the German state also 
provided very reasonable interest rates to new homeowners.110  Middle and working-class people 
would hypothetically prefer a three or four-story building instead of one close to ten if given the 
option.   
North American skyscrapers, according to Brunner, tended to block out sunlight and 
prevent open air spaces with homogeneous rows of tall buildings, which in turn necessitated the 
extreme widening of streets.111  The staggering of upper floors inward he thought to be at least a 
partial solution for the problems of lack of sunlight.112  Skyscrapers were to be built sparingly 
only in locations where they genuinely improved the skyline.113  Brunner used Rio de Janeiro as 
an example of the problems with verticality, as in the Copacabana region: “It almost seems as if 
the eight- to twelve-storey houses were intended to hide the view of this barrio of huts [favelas] 
from the beach, but unfortunately the vista of the hills is thereby covered too.”114  This cosmetic 
solution was unacceptable in Brunner’s eyes.  Verticality masked the true poverty and frequently 
caused more problems than it solved. 
 Brunner was perhaps most concerned with the layout of streets and the flow of traffic.  
He was optimistic for a future in which transportation technology continued to develop at a 
remarkable pace.  He speculated that city streets would soon become two or three stories tall.115  
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The capital was not quite ready for this type of forward-looking constructionhistoric Santiago 
had its own beauty that deserved preserving and celebratingthough Brunner presciently 
recognized that the explosive urbanization would only continue for Santiago and that the city 
would be forced to adapt.  He declared Santiago to be in a “happy situation,” where the Alameda 
and other planned streets could serve as exemplars, though Brunner stressed “…the visitor will 
have to recognize that, in a few decades, this street will become an important road of transit and 
will have to carry the traffic for the barrios that will arise here in the future.116  The colonial grid 
was considered an impediment to desired radial avenues, though it had some advantages when it 
came to the subdivision of blocks.117  Santiago was equipped with other features Brunner viewed 
as promising for its oncoming explosive urbanization.  In a few decades, the city would be 
unrecognizable, and its planners would have to be willing to react quickly and decisively.  All 
they could do was prepare the best they could for the inevitable. 
Several parks, public spaces, and avenues would have to be extended and modified, and 
much of the transformations would take place in the popular barrios.118  Santiago, suggested 
Brunner, shared the flexibility of war-torn European cities, and would have no trouble adjusting 
plots and building blocks, thus assisting the process to “…sanitize insalubrious or dilapidated 
barrios…”119 State-sanctioned programs under Brunner targeted certain roads and parks exactly 
because squatters had traditionally camped out in those locations.  He found Santiago’s 
numerous hills advantageous for this purpose as vantage points.120  Part of Brunner’s plan 
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involved the expectation that working and middle-class families would build their own gardens 
in the style of the English and Dutch, much as many had already done at the foot of San 
Cristóbal hill.121  The state had been broadcasting mixed messages, in the past scolding people 
for making alternative use of their living spaces, and now endorsing it.  Brunner addressed 
Santiago with the macro-management role stereotypically desired by many planners, sitting atop 
the city’s hills imagining the future, and marking out entire sections of slums to be cleared out 
and replaced. 
 
Advancing Modernism 
 
Brunner advised the Second Congress of City Mayors in 1931, where he showcased his 
Urbanism and Industrial Progress Exhibition.122  At this meeting Chilean officials feverishly 
debated how best to solve the housing crisis, and it would inadvertently expose several overt 
flaws in the Austrian’s teachings.  Senator Lira Infante suggested that an institution semi-
independent of the government could create 166,000 homes in three years, but Luis Muñoz 
Maluschka, a student of Brunner, challenged this, declaring that at that rate they would never 
make ground on the shortage of 370,000, as estimated by the Architect’s Association.123  Muñoz 
posited that the solution lay in planning, that housing responsibilities should be completely 
turned over to private sources, and that light material houses should be placed directly on the lots 
of former conventillos, with preference given to wage earners of at least 20 pesos a day.124  Many 
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of the principles learned from Brunner thus would exacerbate the situation, as here the talk of 
minimum earning credentials for social housing could only perpetuate the gap between classes of 
city dwellers.  
At first experimentation with taller buildings was exclusive to designers of office and 
government buildings, but this vertical approach would eventually be applied to apartments.  
Chileans dotted the skyline of their capital city with tall skyscrapers in the early part of the 
century; for example, the triangular Ariztía Building (1921) and the eleven-story Errázuriz-
Simpson office building (1924), which with its additional four-story tower was to be the tallest in 
South America at the time.125  The vertical growth of Santiago was frequently met with the 
sound of protests, as middle-class people worried their views would be blocked and their green 
space jeopardized.  Brunner’s 1933 plan for Santiago advised against excessive building of 
skyscrapers, advocating for a revitalization of the city center.126  Nonetheless, the construction 
continued unabated, partially due to policies that incentivized foreigners investing in 
construction to dodge high taxes.127  
Brunner dominated Chile’s planning scene, though some modernist works began to 
percolate through the barriers.  The Ministry of Finance Building completed in 1933 was 
acknowledged as distinctly Corbusian in style.128  In 1934 Brunner returned to Chile and 
produced his influential “Santiago: Study of the Regulatory Plan of the Central District of the 
City.”129  He organized a local team, headed by Roberto Humeres, Chief of Urbanism, which 
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drew up the definitive “Official Plan for the Urbanization of the Municipality of Santiago,” 
eventually approved in 1939.130  That same year, following the 1939 earthquake that devastated 
both Chillán and Concepción, Le Courbusier tried, but failed, to obtain a commission to generate 
plans for Santiago and other Chilean cities, given that it was met with strenuous objection of 
Brunner’s disciples.131    
 
Brunner’s Manual de Urbanismo 
 
In 1939 Brunner was working in Bogotá, where he published his Manual de Urbanismo, 
in which he drew heavily on his prior Chilean experiences.  He was saliently aware of the 
limitations Chilean governments endured, and he detailed them in this volume.  Brunner wrote: 
“Rudolfo Oyarzún Ph., the renowned Chilean urban planner, speaking recently, of urban 
problems today, spoke about the phenomena and prejudices of urban speculation…132 Brunner 
then went on to directly quote Oyarzún: “’Thus it is not difficult to comprehend that no 
government or municipality has the sufficient economic capacity to finance any path in which 
the expropriations should be based on these speculative valuations.’”133  In the 1930s, the 
General Commissary of Subsistence and Prices, composed of lawyers, decided it was necessary 
to impede housing speculation, but the intervention ultimately failed to have an impact.134  
Brunner and Oyarzún acknowledged that the speculative process often dictated the exclusion of 
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the most marginalized persons.  Still, planners did not abandon their approaches from the prior 
decade. 
Brunner’s Manual employed the “South American conventillo” as an archetype for other 
slums throughout the world, suggesting that the solution was, of course, planning and slum 
clearance.  He described the conventillos as extremely congested in comparison to Central 
Europe, where residents lived in apartments of five to eight stories--in South America, the same 
number of occupants would be crowded into one-story apartments.135  He noted that slums were 
not only located in downtown areas: “There are other sectors further removed from the 
commercial center…  Although the land is cheap, in these regions transformation does not 
happen automatically as they are not attractive to distinguished people.136”  Brunner’s solution to 
these distant off-the-grid slums, as might be expected by now, was efficient planning.  He 
continued: “These sectors can only sanitize and transform themselves through a total 
reconstruction, through an effective and well-organized official action.”137  Brunner celebrated 
Chile’s long history of housing programs as exemplary efforts to be mimicked, making specific 
note of the Urbanism section of the Public Works Department, CORHABIT, and architects like 
Muñoz.138  Brunner admitted that relocating slum dwellers was a difficult task (not to mention 
one that had not been achieved in his decade of work in Chile), but he perceived it to be the only 
solution, as well as one other regions should emulate. 
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CORHABIT 
 
Muñoz, with the Architecture Department of the General Works Office in the 1930s, 
organized the Affordable Housing Exhibition in 1936, which resulted in the formation of the 
National Housing Plan.139  This Exposition focused on the Linear City, as championed by 
participant Carlos Carvajal who insisted that linear planning could solve the problem with the 
huertos obreros.140  Muñoz recommended that adobe structures replace the ranchos, so that they 
would be resistant to fires.141  It was agreed upon at the 1936 Affordable Housing Exposition 
that: 1. A third of the country lacked adequate housing.  2. This totaled some 1,500,000 people.  
3. 300,000 new hygienic homes would need to be built.  4. It would cost between 2 and 3 billion 
escudos.  5. The plan should be passed on to the “financiers” of the Superior Council and Law of 
the Popular Housing Fund.142  Chilean professionals documented the shortage and reported it to 
those who controlled the purse strings. 
The Popular Housing Fund or CORHABIT was fashioned in 1936 to assist with the 
above noted financial shortcomings attributed to state-sponsored housing.143  It was anticipated 
that it would supply one billion escudos for 166,000 houses at a median value of 15,000 escudos.  
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With five people per family, the program was to benefit some 333,000 people.144  One of the few 
organizations to oppose the organization was the Property Owners’ Association of Chile.  The 
group suggested that the state was far too forgiving with late payments, and that in combination 
with low interest rates, CORHABIT presented a competitor with an unfair advantage.145  
CORHABIT projects included the Población Vivaceta, housing 600 families at a rent of between 
170 and 300 pesos, and the Población Montt located adjacent to the Yarur cotton mill.146  Montt 
must have been placed strategically to handle these mill workers, as owner Juan Yarur only 
provided about 10 percent of his employees with company housing, and was notorious for 
leaving employees bound for the conventillos.147  Apart from groups representing the interests of 
property owners, most Chileans saw this as a reasonable step in achieving the type of housing 
they had been fighting to obtain. 
Foreigners showered the Chilean programs with praise, but this meant little for the 
average slum dweller.  Francis Violich, the famed planning professor at UC Berkeley and expert 
on Latin American cities, heralded CORHABIT as the best housing program in all Latin 
America.148  But in 1937, a study found that a twenty-nine-block triangle north of Mapocho 
Station—between Avenidas Bulnes, Independencia, and Borgoño—was still almost entirely 
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composed of conventillos.149  Foreign planners saw a new frontier in the global south where they 
could experiment and relay lessons back to their own nations in an almost carefree, adventurist 
spirit.  This estranged the reader and academic alike from the on-the-ground realities of slum 
dwellers.  Labeling the Chilean program as “the best in Latin America” relegated the entire 
region to an inferior status, as if it were impossible for any Latin American country to become 
equal with the civilized western world.  The seeds of dependency on the outside for technical 
expertise were planted early before the Cold War. 
CORHABIT took about seven or eight years to accumulate momentum, as most of the 
organization’s homes were constructed in the later part of its existence.  Between 1936 and 1952 
the semi-independent institution constructed 43,310 homes;150 however, between 1937 and 1941 
worker housing laws more generally resulted in the construction of some 9,180 homes, 58 
percent sponsored by CORHABIT, and 42 percent created indirectly by the government offering 
tax breaks and investing in self-help programs.  This was a small fraction of the 3,000 promised 
per year by CORHABIT or the 37,000 it projected could be accomplished.151  In 1941 the 
president of CORHABIT blamed this failure on a lack of funds, claiming that if properly 
equipped the organization could have manufactured 5,000 homes a year.152  CORHABIT would 
be reworked in 1943, after which it would become much more effective.  There is some truth in 
the interpretation that CORHABIT failed chiefly due to financial deficiencies, but the housing 
program was also bogged down with ineffective bureaucracies and the drag of nepotism on the 
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appointment of heads of departments.  Furthermore, the institution was not equipped with the 
capability to levy taxes for the money it needed (many would have to be levied against foreign 
corporations), and thus, it could never solve its financial issues internally.    
In short, Chile’s housing and planning laws unmistakably exhibited the dominant 
influence of Brunner in the 1930smost explicitly in the move towards inter-communal plans 
and diverse placement of wide streets, recurrently transitioning Spanish grids into radial cities 
with curvilinear streets and diagonal arteries.  Housing policy evolved meaningfully during the 
1930s under his influence, but as argued by María Isabel Pavez, the insurmountable arrival of 
additional waves of rural migrants in the 1940s masked the fruits of Brunner’s methods, which 
were not made clearly useful until his disciple Muñoz reintroduced his ideas into the 1950s.153  
Thus the 1940s, while left-leaning in many ways, saw much of the above outlined progress in 
planning and housing policy rendered inapplicable, due to inflation and indebtedness to foreign 
lenders.  A resurrection of housing construction would have to wait until the 1950s. 
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Chapter 4: Ambition and Experimentation in the 1940s 
The Popular Front Years 
 
The Popular Front period (1937-41), while brief, greatly impacted the relationship of the 
Chilean state and the poor, leaving a lasting effect for decades to come.  In this reformist-minded 
moment fulltime workerssuch as miners, factory workers and construction workersgained 
political leverage and access to government resources that lasted into the 1950s and 60s.  Radical 
leftist parties were rewarded for their persistence with government offices, though opportunist 
heads of state were repeatedly retired, having promised much and delivered little.  Membership 
in unions and labor syndicates grew impressively, and the same can be said of involvement in 
strikes, which reached a zenith in 1946 with over 70,000 people striking illegally.154  Copper 
miners benefitted from Popular Front policies most as they received “…state subsidies for 
private investment in state jobs, housing, health care, social security, and increases in real 
wages.”155  Workers and labor unions, most of all copper miners, were lionized in the public eye 
during the 1940s, as political rhetoric unabashedly promoted their struggle.  The same cannot be 
said for the most marginalized informal workers.  
Natural disaster again stifled the state’s ability to fund projects and threw the entire 
nation into a panic.  An earthquake struck in April 1939, this time in the south in Chillán, 
devastating the nearby heavily populated coastal city of Concepción.  In January 1940 following 
the tragedy the government created the Corporation for Reconstruction and Assistance, and with 
it the Corporation of Production and Development or CORFO under Muñoz’s Division of 
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Urbanism.156  These organizations were tasked with reconstructing earthquake-damaged regions, 
and CORFO with promoting industrialization and development more generally.  The state could 
not abandon the survivors, many of whom were employed in the copper mines and related 
industries, the core industry of the Concepción region.  These projects necessitated funds the 
government did not have, forcing the state to take out loans.    
The borrowing and debt accrual of the Popular Front eventually caught up with the 
government, triggering inflation.  The cost of living nearly doubled in both Santiago and 
Valparaíso between 1939 and 1943,157 while nationally it rose from 15 percent between 1940 and 
1946, to as high as 84 percent by 1955.158  Higher costs for food (already high due to the lack of 
mechanization and inefficiencies in the structure of the Chilean agricultural realm), 
transportation, and all consumer staples, fell most heavily on the lower classes.  In the late 1940s, 
in response to widespread public discontent President González Videla (1946-1948) “…began to 
resort to repression, with the result that during his administration the country was in a state of 
emergency for nearly half of his term in office.”159   
A law in 1941 allowed the president to set aside state funds and directly offer loans to 
aspiring homeowners.  An estimated 6,000 houses were eventually built through these means.160  
Credit institutions were crafted to keep up with Popular Front promises through general lending, 
as the chaotic jump in prices spurred widespread chants for bread, a roof, and clothing on the 
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streets.161  Houses, however, were not always the primary concern of common people as, for 
example, in 1945 in Quinta Normal, when residents harassed developers attempting to convert a 
football field into low-income apartments.162   
In 1939, the municipal government considered the first Housing Plan completed.  It then 
implemented a second improved master plan for the larger Santiago region, the Greater 
Santiago: Regulatory Study plan based off the sketches of Roberto Humeres.163  At the peak of 
the Popular Front years, between 1938 and 1942, CORHABIT built as many as 9,180 homes, 58 
percent directly by the institution, and the rest by indirect methods such as requiring factory and 
mine owners to provide worker housing, setting up lending institutions for homeowners, or 
provision of construction materials.164   
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the state embraced new methods of funding the 
construction of homes.  For example, a 1943 law restructured the way CORHABIT gathered 
capital.  It dictated that industries set aside five percent of profits for housing workers in addition 
to providing tax breaks for the construction of affordable housing.165  Taxes were levied in areas 
like inheritance, legacies, and donations.166  The law reinvigorated CORHABIT, though it would 
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disintegrate a decade later.167  Between 1944 and 1953 CORHABIT built 35,174 houses, about 
80 percent of total production for its entire existence.  This amounted to roughly 3,000 homes a 
year.168  The lopsided success of this program evidenced that the route to successful social 
programs in fact necessitated a reasonably progressive economic foundation.    
Sanctioned home construction still lagged far behind the needs of the population.  Land 
invasions establishing new neighborhoods began as early as 1940, with Población Arenera 
acknowledged as the very first.169  The new squatters exhibited an unprecedented fearlessness, 
energized by the Popular Front and emerging left-leaning groups.  Communists and socialists 
gained the trust of slum dwellers.  Land invasions like that of La Lengua embodied the 
possibilities.  As Schneider writes, forces of all sorts combined “…creating an array of popular 
grassroots organizations.  Under joint Communist/Socialist leadership, Committees for the 
Homeless, Committees for Just Rents, Committees for Neighborhood Improvement, and 
Committees for Neighborhood health flourished in the poblaciones.”170  Numerous organizations 
of this kind thrived into the late 1940s.  
These popular efforts had their material effect as the forties wound down.  The end of the 
1940s and beginning of the 1950s witnessed the construction of thousands of homes of a 
noticeably improved quality.  The homes built, while impressive in comparison to years past, did 
not scale with explosive urbanization and population increases.  Although foreign observers like 
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Professor Violich once again applauded the success of CORHABIT in 1949,171 in 1947, about 90 
percent of Chilean workers lived intermixed with the unemployed in overcrowded dwellings of 
all varieties.172  Per the Social Service Department of the Labor General Office, there still existed 
32 poblaciones callampas (the mushroom camps that appeared overnight, essentially the new 
iteration of ranchos) housing some 4,579 families.173  Between 1906 and 1952 all worker 
housing laws combined supplied about 50,000 homes.  As has been evidenced here with 
institutions like CORHABIT, most of this activity occurred at the tail end of that period.174   
 
Chilean Modernism 
 
Planners strongly desired order and standardization in the 1940s as they had been primed 
to do in the previous decades, and they pursued these goals through careful detailed policy 
informed by data collection.  The 1944 Ordinance of Urbanization and Affordable Constructions, 
for instance, stipulated exact measurement standards for affordable housing: structures were to 
be placed on surfaces of between 36 and 100 meters squared, to support a multitude of housing 
typologies.175  The law regulated the minimum space between homes, the maximum height of 
buildings and number of floors, as well as minimum light and ventilation.  Communities were 
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required to be linked to potable water, sewage, public lighting, and industrial energy and gas.  
Neighborhood designs were required to include communal spaces and sufficient spacing and 
density.176  One can note the obvious relationship to earlier ambitions, especially the hygienic 
struggles of the 1920s and the fascination with space, sunlight, air, parks, building height etc. 
espoused by Brunner. 
 
Figure 4.1.  Población Huemul II (Source: Luis Valenzuela, “Mass housing and urbanization: on 
the road to modernization in Santiago, Chile, 1930-1960,” Planning Perspectives 23, no. 3 
[2008]: 286) 
 
In the 1940s the ambiguous Popular Front populism allowed housing designers to 
gravitate toward the social messages of the CIAM architects, not to mention the potential for 
cheap construction costs.177  Julio Cordero’s 1943 Población Huemul II typified 1940s 
approaches.  The complex was designed with principles derived from “rationalist 
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architecture.”178  The community replaced a rundown glass factory in Santiago and supplied 186 
homes in rows of three or four at a density of 826 residents per hectare, all organized into 
“manzanas completas” or complete blocks.179  Huemul’s simple boxed design was established as 
the norm for apartment complexes in the following decades. 
 
Sert and Wiener 
 
Chileans reached out to foreign modernists in the 1940s such as Le Corbusier’s disciple 
Josep Lluís Sert, when a connection was made by a corporation complying with government 
housing laws.  A series of communications took place in 1945, per the records of New York City 
urban planner Paul Lester Wiener.180  The Valparaíso Gas Company contacted he and Sert via 
the American Consulate, seeking worker housing in compliance with a 1943 national Chilean 
law,181 illustrating the effectiveness of ulterior methods of promoting housing, such as tax 
incentives and government policies that promoted self-help construction.   
Sert and Wiener officially began a partnership with their Town Planning Associates 
(TPA) in 1941, operating out of New York.  After working for the Brazilian government in 
1943,182 in 1944 the U.S. State Department sponsored three South American lecture tours by 
Wiener, where he advocated for a what he called the “Diagram of the Human Environment” and 
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“The Human Scale of City Planning,” later incorporated into Le Corbusier’s CIAM “grid.”183  
Wiener advocated for a “science of measurement,” whereby fleets of technical experts would be 
deployed before plans would be drawn up.  Urban planning was to take into consideration “…all 
forms of analysis and commentary (public opinion, public authority, specialists, sociologists, 
economists, technicians, etc.)…”184 It is uncertain why the Valparaíso Gas Company took an 
interest in the two architect/planners; perhaps it was a result of experts attending the lectures or 
learning of the TPA’s work in other nations in the region. 
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Figure 4.2.  A TPA prefabricated structure (Source: Josep M Rovira, Jose Lluis Sert: 1901-1983 
[Milano: Electra, 2000], 112) 
 
The first letter made clear the company was interested in the TPA’s specialty; 
prefabricated homes.  These homes would be delivered as packaged modular parts, constructed 
out of cheap, durable, lightweight materials, to be assembled on location.  The connection was 
facilitated by the Foreign Construction Unit at the U.S. Department of Commerce.185  The Gas 
Company had very specific requests; it sought houses 20’ by 24’ that could be expanded to 20’ 
by 36’ with the addition of bedrooms, and that were to be constructed of damp-proof and fire-
resistant material.186   A Wiener document directly quoted the initial inquiry as reading “…the 
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country needs urgently 300,000 workmen’s houses and no less than 10,000 yearly, to absorb the 
increase of population.  We are studying different solutions for our problem and are very much 
interested in receiving this information.”187  Wiener presumed the request would open the door to 
serving the Chilean country generally rather than simply the Gas Company. 
Chileans were testing the water with Sert and Wiener’s TPA, and it is uncertain why the 
deal never went through.  In a document titled “Chile – Estimate,” Wiener carefully calculated 
the costs of the requested houses, and anticipated each “superstructure” would amount to about 
$1,250.00.188  It can be assumed this was either too expensive for the Chilean company or that 
they found a better option, for the correspondence ended herein 1946 Sert and Wiener moved 
on to Peru, where they were commissioned to generate a master plan for the port city of 
Chimbote.189  The entire communication evidences a willingness of Chileans in the mid-1940s, 
with slightly better funding than previous decades, to search for housing solutions abroad, 
including with planners and architects directly connected to Le Corbusier. 
 
Father Lebret  
 
Other planning schools made an impact on Chilean professionals in this era.  In 1947, the 
same year as CIAM 6 in England, the French Dominican friar Louis-Joseph Lebret, leader of the 
Economy and Humanism movement with origins in the early part of the decade, made his first 
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trip to Latin America, visiting both Brazil and Uruguay.190  In June, he met with several 
members of Chile’s burgeoning “Falange Nacional” movement (the predecessors of the Christian 
Democrats) in Montevideo, and created the Latin American Centre of Economy and Humanism 
(CLAEH) housed in the Uruguayan capital.191  Between September 7th and 11th he held the 
Inter-American Session on Economics and Humanism, which featured fifteen Chilean 
representatives.192  In the 1940s, Chileans were traveling abroad to scout out and recruit 
professionals. 
Lebret’s teachings reiterated the technocratic approach of most other planners who were 
popular in Chile at the time.  Religious professionals advised the whole region during the 
Liberation Theology movement of the 1960s, who did not necessarily view populism, religion, 
and science as the least bit mutually exclusive.  Lebret’s IRFED (Institute for Research and 
Training in Development), founded in 1958, prided itself on a comprehensive curriculum.  
Goulet writes that the IRFED required that students “…be acquainted with the assumptions and 
methodology of all the major disciplineseconomics, planning, human geography, cross-
cultural sociology, politics, nutrition, demography, and so on.193  Lebret had students from all 
over the globe and established a diversity of tools to reflect this, expanding his curriculum 
beyond strictly planning.  He preached a humanistic approach to development and planning.  He 
was immensely influential up until his death in 1966, even sitting as an expert at the famous 
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Vatican Council II from 1962 to 1964.194  Lebret was deeply involved in the Christian Liberation 
movement.  He quoted and saw his work as in conversation with influential thinkers like Marx, 
Kropotkin, and Nietzsche.195  Lebret wished to ensure the Church addressed the material realities 
of poverty under capitalism or face losing relevance to radicalism.  He understood that religion 
had to adapt to the needs of the poor, their last remaining bastion of support. 
Architecture magazines, authored by the same professionals who headed institutions and 
instructed university courses, heavily dictated the character of development efforts.  In 1946 the 
publication Arquitectura y Construcción which had a close relationship with CORFO and had 
been championing the use of earthquake-resistant materials like reinforced concretewarned 
that urban decentralization of the population was necessary, as 70 percent of Chile’s people and 
industry were centered in the Santiago-Valparaíso axis.196  58.4 percent of Chileans lived in 
urban centers in 1950, reinforcing the narrative of inevitable collapse put forward by 
Arquitectura y Construcción.197  Brunner’s predictions had become reality; infrastructure could 
not handle the strain of urbanization.  Professionals, privy to years of data collection, warned of 
imminent collapse.  In the 1940s, the problems with the centralized urban corridor of the country 
were glaringly evident.  
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Chapter 5: Steady Progress in the 1950s 
Callampas and Campamentos: Locating Lower-income Neighborhoods during Ibáñez 
 
Housing programs continued to advance even as the economy generally swiftly spiraled 
downward in the 1950s.  Between December 1952 and April 1955, the cost of living rose 207 
percent.198  During Carlos Ibáñez del Campo’s second term (1952-58), public transport costs rose 
by 50%, while economic growth fell to 2.5%.  His government bore down on labor with austerity 
measures to combat inflation and generate revenue domestically.199  Anti-inflation policies 
motivated popular discontent, such as riots that broke out in the streets of Valparaíso in March 
1957 over bus fare hikes.200  Popular dissatisfaction was vocalized more over the severe increase 
in the price of commodities like sugar (100 percent increase) and transportation (50 percent) than 
the lack of homes, though the housing shortage and the incoming rural migrants remained a 
pressing issue.201  Austerity measures were the primary concern for the time being, as people 
needed to eat and get to work above all else. 
Ibáñez had no qualms about repressing popular upheavals.  During his administration, the 
demographic spacing of the capital drastically shifted, as class became more polarizing and 
pertinent to neighborhood makeup.  His administration instituted a strike ban and drastic cuts in 
economic assistance to workers in November 1954, a crackdown on students and workers with 
the police,202 and even declared martial law, which involved occupying Santiago with thousands 
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of troops, a policy that stayed in effect until February 29th 1956.203  The wealthy, seeing crowds 
of poor protestors and fearing for their safety, built homes in the hardly settled northeast suburbs 
of the city.204  The rich opted for the secluded oft garden-style communities nearer to the foot of 
the Andes, rather than the downtown so desired in colonial times.  Spatially, cities were divided 
by class via organic migration, zoning laws, and financial realities.  The rich quickly discovered 
which neighborhoods they preferred and took measures to keep the poor out. 
The poor expanded their shanties in every direction away from the city core other than 
the northeast.  Development of poor communities took place in locations like south of 
downtown, in territory already composed of conventillos and in rapidly growing lower-class 
suburbs like San Miguel.  In 1952, the city was approaching 1.5 million inhabitants.205  The first 
Chilean housing census of 1952 used the separate specialized terms campamento, poblacion, and 
callampa.206  The census found that 36.2 percent of Santiago lived in substandard housing 
conditions.207  3,500 were in “conventillos or similar”, and 225,000 in poblaciones and 
campamentos.208  Social Service Department listed some 16,502 families lived in 
campamentos.209  The squatting problem had only deteriorated, as the poor gravitated towards or 
could only afford to illegally camp out.  Conventillos were no longer the dominant form of low 
income housing; instead many more of the poor found themselves in the tents and shacks of the 
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poblaciones, campamentos, and callampas, foreshadowing the tumultuous events of the late 
1960s.  Physical growth of the city was almost entirely due to shanties and camps. 
San Miguel was a persistent problematic thorn that managed to disrupt planning efforts.  
Politician Mario Palestro nicknamed the neighborhood the “Independent Republic of San 
Miguel,” exaggerating its tendency to defy any outside authority.210  The southern region of 
Santiago, which had been owned by the Subercaseaux family in colonial times, had reached 
100,000 by the 1950s.  Elsey writes: “State projects that relocated squatters from the city’s center 
and northern neighborhoods to San Miguel further stretched the municipality’s resources.  This 
population increase resulted in severe housing shortages keeping the quality of substandard.”211  
The municipal government had given up on San Miguel, as the neighborhood was perceived as 
entirely beyond regulation or rescue.  In a self-defeating strategy, the government relocated any 
squatters there and let the people manage themselves. 
The shanties were primed for tragedy, as poorly constructed shacks of found materials 
could only last so long against natural elements.  Crisis in the shacks produced increased land 
invasions on unused government property and in the backyards of the landlord-descended rich.  
In 1956 a fire raged through the city’s largest callampa, Zanjón de la Aguada in San Miguel 
along the river, leaving several thousand stranded.212  The newly homeless were given 
emergency shelter in the Municipal Stadium of San Miguel, where they planned the famous La 
                                                     
210 Elsey, Citizens and Sportsmanship, 168. 
211 Ibid., 169. 
212 Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, 42-43; In 1957 Zanjón de la Aguada, 
despite being wrecked by fire, was still Santiago’s largest callampa, with 35,000 inhabitants.  
Zanjón housed between 5,000 and 6,000 families, and would eventually be split into ten distinct 
regions, see González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 22. 
 74 
 
Victoria land invasion.213  Women’s committees were heavily involved in land seizures 
including La Victoria.  These women organized a free medical clinic and prohibited liquor to 
preclude sexual and physical abuse.214  In the same year communists and socialists asked 
CORHABIT to purchase land for squatters, who would eventually complete payment in rent.215  
La Victoria’s three thousand families, partially organized by the Communist Party’s Committee 
of the Homeless, demanded CORVI (the Housing Corporation, discussed below) provide utilities 
such as running water.216  Land invasions were not spontaneous land grabs but instead 
complicated strategic plans thought out months in advance and executed at the most opportune 
time, though at times an occurrence like a fire or earthquake forced immediate action. 
 
CORVI, CORHABIT, and Self-help Programs 
 
Government housing institutions were afforded more capabilities in the 1950s, as policy 
makers increased funding and consolidated bureaucracies: 20.4 percent of the national budget 
was spent on housing and urban development in 1955, and in the 1960s that number increased to 
25 percent.217  CORHABIT was merged into the Urbanism Section in 1953, creating the Housing 
Corporation or CORVI, under the guidance of Luis Muñoz Maluschka.218  The same year 
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CORVI and CORHABIT partnered under the Urban Planning and Construction Law to develop 
a national housing plan, which in the words of Schneider:  
…included delivery of finished houses for middle-income groups.  It also contemplated 
elimination of poblaciones callampas through delivery of plots to be followed by self-
built homes for low-income groups.  In addition, the program contemplated an important 
housing subsidy to help low-income families cover mortgage payments.  Ultimately, 
however, these subsidies, based on people’s capacity to save, benefitted high- but not 
low-income groups.219 
 
Lending programs like that under the Chilean Chamber of Construction or the Chilean State 
Bank in 1953 fell into this same pattern of ineffectiveness by subsidizing the wrong 
population.220 
The poor, in the meantime, could never save enough to meet minimum standards for 
loans.  The Social Service Department estimated some 32,237 families still lived in 
campamentos in 1959.221  An estimated eight percent of Santiago, 150,00 persons, were thought 
to be homeless by the end of the decade.222  CORVI and CORHABIT delivered completed 
homes to the middle-class people, while the poorest were expected to construct their own with 
what little self-help assistance was offered.  This approach aligned with a burgeoning capitalist 
ideology that took a couple more decades to become fully established in Chile, one that blamed 
the poor for their own poverty, as avenues out of poverty were claimed to exist if they were only 
willing to work hard enough. 
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Self-help programs were geared more toward the poor than the middle class.  The Self-
Construction and Mutual Aid Program between the Chilean and U.S. governments constructed 
close to 3,000 housing units in the 1950s.  However, homes were commonly situated along the 
banks of rivers and canals, and in turn were completely cut off from basic infrastructure and 
public services, as well as susceptible to disaster like flooding.223  Self-help was not a new 
concept in Chile, as explored here, however at this moment the practice became increasingly 
associated with and directed at the poor.  The stigma of residing in the slums carried on when 
transferred to (mostly privately funded) self-help homes, as they were placed where ranchos had 
traditionally been located.  Space held a deep and complex relationship with the past such that 
class divisions could not be easily overcome with orderly neighborhood plans and brand new 
concrete walls.    
 
Alberto Cruz and 1950s Modernism 
 
In Viña del Mar, Alberto Cruz and his associates at the Architecture Institute of the 
Pontifica Universidad Católica de Valparaiso operated ambitiously with the support of 
adventurous investors, symbolizing the popularization modernists gained in the 1950s.  His work 
always centered on the poor.  For example, in Achullapa, where Pérez de Arce writes: “The 
commission envisioned the creation of a working-class residential zone situated on the plateaus 
behind the urban area, following the trend that relegated low-cost workers’ dwellings to the 
periphery.  Cruz, however, proposed an alternative placement closer to the center and organized 
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the dwellings around a boulevard offering easy access to the urban core.”224  Cruz boldly tested 
boundaries with the placement of worker housing.  He ignored the concerns espoused by the rich 
and instead made worker homes the focal point of Viña del Mar; they deserved the beach air and 
the convenient transportation most of all.  The blank slate on the sea emphasized the advanced 
design concepts alive in Chile, as well as the willingness of some, like the Church, to promote 
such experimental programs that centered the poor.   
University construction fostered change in architecture and planning that made modernist 
apartment complexes possible.  Bresciana, Valdés, Castillo, and Huidobro designed the 
Universidad Técnica del Estado, with a curriculum focused on industry and technology, on parts 
of the Quinta Normal park.225  The “Ciudad Universitaria” or university city, built between 1957 
and 1962, was a large L shape that included green central courtyards and an adjacent student 
housing complex, the Unidad Vecinal Portales.226  As early as the 1930s, college campuses were 
constructed in the style of a university city, as was the trend throughout Latin America.  These 
were self-contained campuses that centralized all facets of student life, linking apartments, 
classrooms, cafeterias, etc. through pedestrian courtyards.227  Brunner’s 1931 plan for 
Concepción, for instance, included an independent design for the Universidad de Concepción.228  
It is not surprising that the contemporary practices were well-received in Chile, as their history 
would suggest decades of interest. 
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Figure 5.1.  Brutalist Portales Neighborhood (Source: 
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/487303622153047834/) 
 
Architects made clear their devotion to incorporating modernist teachings.  A series of 
experimental lower-class dwellings were built in Corbusian style, increasingly the norm in the 
1940s, 50s, and 60s.229  The shift was organic.  The Población Juan Antonio Ríos in Santiago 
was at the forefront of this trend, built between the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was composed 
of some 5,271 dwellings.230  The 1954 Población Arauco in Santiago presented open green 
spaces and sleek staircases.  Two-story homes were grouped in “manzanas alargadas” (extended 
blocks).  The whole complex was composed of 300 homes.231  Chinchorro (1955-56) and Estadio 
(1956-57), constructed by the Bresciani Valdés Castillo Huidobro firm, showcased the 
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capabilities of the team and reiterated a willingness to create affordable housing.232  The 1955 to 
1958 Portales neighborhood was built by the same superstar firm.  Liernur describes the 
construction: “The most original feature is the continuation of the open-air corridors as raised 
passerelles, which created a circulation grid that passes right over the houses…”233 The complex 
was composed of 2,000 units and was globally recognized as a brutalist flagship.234  Affordable 
housing displayed a distinctly Chilean character by the 1950s, with large complexes constructed 
of typically earthquake-resistant concrete with plenty of shade, embodying the spirit of life in the 
arid zone between the Pacific and the Andes.  These housing complexes ensured the same 
qualities desired for decades; clean air, sunlight, community and green space, solid cheap 
materials, etc.   
 
CORFO 
 
A 1959 earthquake added to the distressing pattern of tremors reappearing to haunt the 
country every decade.  President Alessandri was forced to adopt platforms of public expenditure 
and increased taxation.  Tidal waves wreaked havoc in the Valdivia area with 2.5 million people 
affected, as: “Three thousand people perished during this natural disaster, thousands were left 
homeless, and the damage to buildings, factories, mines, and the infrastructure was so extensive 
                                                     
232 Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile,” in Latin America in Construction, 158. 
233 Jorge Francisco Liernur, “Architecture for Progress: Latin America, 1955-1980,” in Latin 
America in Construction, 77. 
234 In 1964 the Portales Neighborhood, designed by Bresciani, Valdés, Castillo & Huidobro, was 
completed after ten years of construction and “…internationally recognized following its 
publication in the book The New Brutalism, by Reynar Banham,” see Torrent, “Abstraction and 
Tectonics in Chilean Architecture since 1950,” in Chilean Modern Architecture since 1950, 98. 
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that it required external financial assistance.”235  The IMF advised the Chilean government to 
deploy CORFO in the region with a ten-year plan, as well as urging Alessandri to ask congress 
for increased taxes.236  Emergency capabilities were bestowed upon the president in such 
moments, under the 1958 State Security Act.237  The government mobilized CORFO to address 
the crisis of poverty and housing shortages more broadly, beyond the devastated area.  This 
enabled the expansion of CORFO capabilities, instilling a trust and openness among Chileans for 
developmentalist agendas.  The Chilean government’s mobilization of CORFO funds legitimized 
a technocratic approach to housing and infrastructure.  
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Chapter 6: Conflict, Reform, and Housing in the Frei Era 
The Alliance for Progress and Expanded U.S. Funding  
 
In the 1960s, the U.S. aimed to influence most social programs and government policies 
in Latin America.  Social engineering, it was thought, would ensure that the capitalist vision of 
modernization would prevail over any alternatives.  Financial aid was invested to prevent 
popular discontent and any turn toward radicalism.  Corporations, charities, and state-sanctioned 
and international bodies like the IMF and the World Bank collaborated to influence Latin 
American countries thought to be vulnerable to communism.238  Chile was a prime target for 
major funding given its affinity for leftism and populism, as well as its role as one of the more 
intellectually significant centers of South America. 
The 1960 Act of Bogotá and the 1961 Punta del Este Charter set the gears in motion for 
what would become the notoriously flawed Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) with the intention of 
achieving the above objectives.  ALPRO was a vaguely defined web of U.S. financial and 
technical assistance programs to Latin America.239  Chile submitted a national plan to the 
program immediately.   
In the 1960s, the ‘Big 3’ foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie), which had been 
investing in Latin America back to the 1920s, promoted and assisted the goals of ALPRO.  Slum 
                                                     
238 Many note the visceral hostility that Vice President Richard Nixon and his wife faced 
throughout Latin America during their 1958 trip as part of the reasoning behind increased U.S. 
interest in the region, as people hurled insults and even objects at the couple. 
239 It originally had a budget of about $1,000 million for the entire region of Latin America. In 
1961, the Punta del Este Charter established the Social Progress Trust Fund, which had an initial 
budget of $525 million, see Felipe Herrera, “The Inter-American Bank: Catalyst for Latin 
American Development,” The World Today 20, no.11 (1964): 481, accessed March 9, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393559; “The Chilean Land Reform: A Laboratory for the 
Alliance-for-Progress Techniques,” The Yale Law Journal 73, no.2 (1963): 134, accessed March 
9, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/794770. 
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clearance and a measure of legal protection were high on their agendas.240  Parmar writes: 
“Elitist, technocratic, utilitarian, and ethnocentric, the foundations’ leaders presided over huge 
endowments that were aimed at social engineering.  Their philosophy was generally practical, 
pragmatic, and utilitarian.”241  Their projects channeled a sympathy for the poor while 
perpetuating at the same time a U.S.-centric vision of the world scarcely indistinguishable from 
Cold War propaganda.    
The formation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 1959 augmented the 
effectiveness of U.S. aid programs to Latin America.242  In the 1960s the resources and 
mechanisms of delivery made possible “…[u]sing U.S. funds, the [IADB] would make loans 
across Latin America to help infrastructure projects in transportation, health, and education.”243     
Despite immense pressure, Chileans had refused to break relations with the Cubans, 
undoubtedly stirring tensions and intensifying U.S. attention to the country.244  Countless 
development projects were undertaken in Chile under the auspices of the above funding.  The 
money had no visible end in the early and mid-1960s, as Chileans acquiesced to ALPRO and the 
IMF’s recommendations.245  By 1962 U.S. aid to Chile had reached $200 million.  The 
                                                     
240 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, & Rockefeller 
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Alessandri government (1958-64) received about $447.7 million in U.S. aid, dwarfing the $69.1 
million given to Ibáñez (1952-58),246 and between 1962 and 1969 Chile received $743 million 
from U.S. sources.247  Between 1961 and 1971, Chile received the “…highest per capita US aid 
in Latin America,” second only to Vietnam globally.248 
ALPRO structured the IA-ECOSOC (the Inter-American Economic and Social Council) 
to provide technical experts to Latin American countries to conduct studies, for example, to 
gather figures as to how many homes each nation was expected to build with the economic 
aid.249  Chile’s ten-year plan satisfied ALPRO representatives with its embrace of stringent 
planning.  The January 1961 ten-year development plan, “…which CORFO economists, 
managers, and engineers drafted…” centered on an agenda prescribed by U.S. aid, mostly 
focused on electrical power, as well as mechanization of agriculture and industry.250  The plan 
internalized ALPRO’s suggested paths to economic growth, promoting housing construction 
along with mechanization and electrification.251  The rural sector certainly required 
modernization, a fact no Chilean would question: efficiency would produce more grain, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
$5.4 from Food for Peace, see Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, 54-56, see table 3.1; Ibid., 
50. 
246 Kofas, The Sword of Damocles, 146. 
247 This was “11.8 percent of all the Alliance for Progress money sent to Latin America.  It was 
the third highest recipient of U.S. funding behind only Brazil and Colombia,” see Taffet, Foreign 
Aid as Foreign Policy, 67. 
248 Michaels, “The Alliance for Progress and Chile’s ‘Revolution in Liberty,’” 77.  
249 Ibid., 50. 
250 Ibid., 141. 
251 U.S. corporations naturally would profit, as Latin Americans were encouraged to purchase 
U.S. tools and machinery. In the case of housing, Chileans were expected to import construction 
materials and prefab homes, see Winn, Weavers of Revolution. 
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necessary to all regions of the country, in turn stabilizing what had been sky-high inflation in 
agricultural prices.252   
 
Housing Shortages in the 1960s 
 
At the end of the 1950s unemployment had at least doubled in every Chilean city.  
Poverty and insufficient housing remained prevalent.  The urban housing shortage was an 
estimated five times that of rural sectors.253  The country lacked at least 1.5 million homes, with 
most of the deficit in Santiago and other cities.254  
Table 6.1.  Housing shortages in Santiago 
 
(Source: Hidalgo Dattwyler, “La vivienda social en Chile,” 5) 
 By 1960, Santiago, now a city of 2 million, had physically expanded in area to 20,900 
hectares, about three times its 1930 size.255  The United Nations Center for Housing and 
Planning considered 25 percent of Santiago neighborhoods to be slums in 1964, and 20 percent 
                                                     
252 Stabilization and growth of the economy effectively required massive outside financial 
assistance. Nationalization of major industries would most likely have been the only other 
option, but was not tolerated by foreign advisors; even if nationalization were achieved, copper, 
wheat, textiles and other products would remain subject to swings in global market prices and to 
spending constraints faced by domestic consumers. 
253 Shaw describes the urban shortage as “…ranging from a deficiency of 18.5/100 in the 
province of Valparaíso to 56.8/100 in the province of Linares,” see Shaw, Land Tenure and the 
Rural Exodus in Chile, 18. 
254 Power, Right-Wing Women in Chile, 16. 
255 Valenzuela, “Mass housing and urbanization,” 265; At this point, the plan initiated in 1960, 
the Plan Intercomunal de Santiago 1960-94 MOP, as the title would imply, intended to project 
growth for the next several decades, see Isabel Pavez, “El plan Brunner para Santiago,” 1. 
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of Valparaiso’s housing was labeled inadequate.256  The situation gained attention in the U.S; a 
1961 article in the New York Times headlined “CHILE SQUATTERS DEMAND HOUSING: 
10,000 Homeless Camp on Site of Delayed Project” highlighted the tragedy in Santiago.257  The 
piece noted the people had been waiting about five years for homes though they had already paid 
deposits, and that four children had died in the harsh cold.258  The article read: “The most 
elaborate structures have rickety wooden frames, corrugated roofs held in place by stones, and 
sides formed of boards, canvas or blankets.  Some squatters have dug into the ground and put dirt 
around their tents as protection against the wind and cold.”259  Chileans were depicted as some 
poor souls in a far-off land, living in structures U.S. cities had long-abandoned as relics of the 
19th century.260   
 
Frei and Housing Initiatives 
 
In 1964 the centrist Christian Democrats, as part of the effort to win workers and sway 
them away from the left, renewed attention on the struggles of the poor, as advised by ALPRO.  
ALPRO employed what Taffet calls impact projects, propaganda, to help the Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC) elect Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-70) Frei over the Socialist Party’s 
Salvador Allende.  U.S. dollars were mobilized to ensure the poor knew Frei and his platform’s 
progressive promises.261    
                                                     
256 Shaw, Land Tenure and the Rural Exodus, 17, see Table 1.5. 
257 Edward C. Burks, “Chile Squatters Demand Housing,” The New York Times, August 2, 1961. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 The Great Chicago Fire of 1871 comes to mind. 
261 The PDC was a party representing the interests of the new urban elite, the middle class.  It 
emerged as a centrist movement out of progressive Catholic sympathy for the poor and U.S.-
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Frei increased spending on housing by 66.3 percent between 1964 and 1967, as well as 
on the urban sector more generally by 114.9 percent.262  He proposed, as Oxhorn describes, 
“…the construction of 60,000 new homes per year for 6 years… The state would support home 
ownership with loans, flexible financing, and subsidies based on wage levels.  To ensure new 
houses were in viable communities, Frei promised the construction of shopping areas, parks, 
theaters, and schools.”263  Frei understood this would not completely solve housing shortages, 
but construction was also expected to provide jobs and spark the economy.264  The lower classes 
made the Frei victory possible, as they gravitated to his focus on “’…bread-and-butter’ concerns 
of the day (jobs, housing, control of inflation, and educational opportunity).”265  The poor were 
not necessarily radicalized beyond accepting reformism—most were willing to settle for a decent 
wage and an end to the absurdly high costs of living.266  
Frei was invested in a wide array of social programs as he wished to preserve his 
popularity with the lowest sectors.  He encouraged localized organizing, in turn validating 
grassroots activism techniques used in the past.  Frei’s “Popular Promotion” policy was intended 
to encourage the formation of neighborhood councils, mothers’ centers, youth centers, sport 
                                                                                                                                                                           
financed efforts to combat Communism.  The party already had some roots in the Liberation 
Theology movement, when religious figures genuinely took interest in the struggles of the poor, 
see González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 23; Many of the PDC politicians, including 
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America (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University, 
1983). 
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clubs and other local groups.267  Between 1964 and 1970, roughly 21,917 organizations were 
assembled under Popular Promotion, in which over 660,000 people participated.268  This 
included 3,487 neighborhood councils and 9,000 mothers’ centers.269  Although the Frei era was 
quintessentially one of bourgeois politics, behind the scenes there was immense public support 
for taking ownership of one’s struggles and aggressively seeking change. 
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Figure 6.1.  Map of Operación Sitio locations (Source: Gideon Long, “Story of Cities #33: how 
Santiago tackled its urban housing crisis with ‘Operation Chalk,’” the Guardian April 29, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/apr/29/story-cities-33-santiago-chile-housing-crisis-
operacion-sitio-operation-chalk#img-3) 
 
In 1964, Frei’s Operación Sitio (Operation Housing Site) functioned by granting the poor 
land purchased from private developers by the government.270  It became known as Operation 
Chalk (Tiza), as between 1964 and 1970 up to new 65,000 plots were literally drawn out by 
residents with chalk.271  On the new plots the program went about “…providing semi-urbanized 
                                                     
270 Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile, 50. 
271 Justin McGuirk, Radical Cities: Across Latin America in Search of a New Architecture 
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sites for people to build their own housing.”272  The 1964 self-help program shaped the 
neighborhoods of Sara Gajardo, Las Parcelas, Villa O’Higgins, and La Herminda, where an 
estimated 100,000 families benefitted from these lots.273  Two years into the program, however, 
funds ran out, and Operación Sitio was forced to reach out to the Chilean Chamber of Private 
Builders, who required that the focus of the housing project be reoriented away from the poor.274  
This self-help program established neighborhoods for the poor in peripheral suburbs like San 
Miguel, Conchalí, Barrancas, and La Cisterna, as illustrated by the above map.  The same 
problematic regions of the city lingered on from the initial carving up of Santiago. 
In 1965 MINVU (the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism) was formed and charged with 
handling all matters of housing and planning.  The ministry remained Chile’s principal housing-
related tool after the 1960s, and remains so to this day.  The new ministry, armed with capacities 
unrivaled by previous generations, went about pursuing massive projects in home construction, 
zoning, standardization, etc.  MINVU was composed of “…28 institutions depending on 8 
departments relating to housing.”275  It centralized all the government’s precursor housing 
agencies; it absorbed and or guided CORVI, CORHABIT, CORMU (the Corporation of Urban 
Improvement), and numerous other private, public, and hybrid housing related organizations.276   
MINVU initiated an intercommunal plan for greater Santiago and commenced suburban 
zoning.277  The plan dictated uniform lot sizes for single-family homes built of solid materials 
                                                     
272 González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City, 89. 
273 This was coupled with the Popular Savings Plan, which provided private loans for home 
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along a grid pattern, which was intended to ensure expanded access to transportation and 
government institutions.278  It was crafted by working closely with USAID and the IDB and 
aimed to “sanear” (sanitize) neighborhoods and “integrate” inhabitants.279  With regard to 
downtown dwellings, “…government strategies within the domain of urban planning and design 
introduced a mandatory typology of twenty-story apartment towers.”280   
 
The MINVU Archives: Planning for Lower-income Santiago in the Late 1960s 
 
Chile’s robust history of grassroots organization provided for well-informed and 
experienced citizens of the lower classes, as evidenced by the types of petitions MINVU 
received in its first five years.  Poor inhabitants elected representatives to appeal for their needs 
in the transition to the new government body.  A petition in the MINVU archives inquired (in 
legal jargon) whether new homes would be held to the same standards as those under CORVI 
and Social Security.281  Requesting housing through the state required navigation of complex 
bureaucratic structures, forcing the poor to recruit the assistance of middle class professionals.282  
Labor leaders were amongst the loudest and most influential in pressuring for the construction of 
dwellings.283   
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MINVU used many of the same tactics that proved successful in the past.  For example, it 
incentivized lending for affordable housing, as the Central Bank offered a “rediscount” to 
smaller banks.  For buildings to qualify they had to comply with exact standards recently 
outlined by MINVU.284   
The working-class San Miguel neighborhood south of downtown, where the city’s poor 
had traditionally been abandoned, received the bulk of the assistance and attention from MINVU 
and other government bodies in the second half of the 1960s.  An October 1967 document 
addressed to the Director of MINVU highlighted recent talks between the Urban Planning 
Development sub-department and the Minister of Public Health “…about the situation of a 
habitable zone in the middle of a frozen industrial zone of the community of San Miguel…285  
The document pointed to the MINVU Plan, and that per the new ordinance “…in the mixed 
zones with bothersome industry or frozen industrial zones, the installation of new bothersome 
industries is not permitted and the existing ones can only extend or improve themselves.286”  
MINVU officials utilized Santiago zoning ordinances to enforce physical change in the 
neighborhood and improve the quality of life, frequently openly favoring the rights of citizens 
and their dwellings over industrial development.  Housing placement became recognized as 
linked to quality of life: “The localization of households in these areas are contemplated 
considering beforehand the inconveniences that their installation can generate for the residents of 
                                                     
284 Session No. 2.034 of July 21, 1965: the reimbursement to banks were only for buildings 
“…that do not exceed 70m2. excluding corridors, stairs and communal surfaces, that they adjust 
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them.”287  Even the poor apparently might deserve a life free of the noisy, polluting, imposing 
factories, and as such zoning ordinances would hypothetically guard the San Miguel residents 
from “harmful industries,” which otherwise would take liberties to expand unchecked.   
MINVU ambitions included supplying residents with access to ample public space, which 
in turn could be positioned in strategic ways to serve other planning goals.  A June 1968 
document described a large T-shaped “Projected Park,” designed to “…solve the lack of Green 
Spaces in this sector.”288  The park in San Miguel espoused the ideals of practical zoning, and 
specifically attempted to segregate industrial and residential development with a buffer zone 
where “… [Virginia street] widens to 25 meters, between Central Avenue and 1st Street as to 
isolate the Industrial block from the Housing Zone.”289  Public works could assist the planners in 
influencing the private development, over which it did not have direct control.   MINVU zoning 
policies in San Miguel took as their purpose serving residents through gently guiding the path of 
development, gradually dampening the problems associated with proximity to factory pollution 
or disconnectedness from public transportation and public space, for example.   
Regulations and standards were of course also used to restrict resident’s construction and 
direct settlement patterns, as the social engineering ideas of ALPRO and charities recommended.  
Planning was used to alter neighborhood composition, and at times unreasonable expectations 
equated to dislocation.  A July 1968 document dictated that buildings in the industrial zone of 
San Miguel were to be between 5 and 6 meters from the medians.  Antejardíns (front gardens) 
could not be extended too far toward certain streets.  Fences along streets involved in the region 
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could not exceed 2.4 meters.290  Presumably in this way laws managed to exclude many of the 
families who carried with them their agricultural practices, and turned to their small plots for 
extra subsistence.  The document noted the advantages of this “…modification is the freeing of 
future expropriation around 30 households of the Carmen Nueva neighborhood, with the 
beneficial consequence for a numerous group of families who live there and which otherwise, 
sooner or later need to be eradicated.291  MINVU officials promoted secure living conditions for 
residents, but slum clearance was part and parcel of their idea of improving a neighborhood.  In 
this instance planners suggested the thirty San Miguel families would be better off if the 
government hurried the inevitable slum-clearance process, showing they lacked true 
understanding of or did not fully appreciate the needs of the poor.     
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Figure 6.2.  Conchalí addition (Source: Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Archivo Nacional 
de la Administración, author’s photograph) 
 
 The Conchalí province to the north was another area of interest for MINVU as several 
established homes wished to be officially incorporated.  The community was composed of self-
help homes though properties had been attained through land invasions on large portions of an 
aristocratic family’s estate.  The lines between squatter and self-help beneficiary were somewhat 
blurred at this moment.  In a letter addressed to the Director General of Public Works dated 
February 1966, the suggestion was made that the agricultural neighborhood of “Villa Conchalí” 
(formerly Villa Julio San Martin) be incorporated into the communal plan.292  Per a MINVU 
document from November 1965, the Villa Conchalí residents had successfully petitioned for the 
                                                     
292 Ibid. 
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inclusion of their neighborhood in October, based on “the Direction of Public Works in view of 
that solicited by the representatives of the Society of self-help Villa Conchalí.”293   
In February 1966, a document addressed to the Minister of MINVU and signed by the 
Executive Vice President of CORVI, advocated for the appropriation of land privately owned by 
one man and housing squatters, siding in favor of the Conchalí residents, as it was decided best 
“…to declare necessary the lands owned by the Suc. Raúl Díaz Riesco, located in the 
Community of Conchalí of this city, those which currently, one finds occupants of the 
Neighborhood ‘JULIO SOTO PEÑA,’ composed of 123 illegal occupants.”294  The division of 
this larger property into smaller plots was typical in Chile by this point.  The document labeled 
the residents “illegal” yet sought to provide a path to legitimate ownership, posing interesting 
questions about the thin line between official or nonofficial.295  A planning survey illustrated that 
the plots were in a neat polygonal shape, which it was assumed would make for seamless 
incorporation.296  CORVI acted as the purchaser of the inhabited land, which was ostensibly 
passed on to be developed.  If land was going to be allotted to the occupants, it was going to be 
done along a regulated plan that provided for easy integration into the city.   
Las Condesa well-known middle and upper-class suburban neighborhood, not only in 
the 1960s but in contemporary timeswas surprisingly susceptible to pressure from poorer 
residents, per the MINVU archives.  This same ambiguous squatting/self-help status of the 
residents here provoked a debate over the incorporation of homes Las Condes.  A text signed by 
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295 Did land titles make residents suddenly “legal?”  If so, this had already been recognized as an 
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the Director of Works and addressed to the mayor of Las Condes in July 1965 highlighted the 
problems of some 250 families, which he describes as having “… a great number of persons of 
scarce resource who live in conditions of instability and misery.”297  He suggested a study should 
be conducted that would examine the benefits of incorporation and the suitability of the 
community to mesh with the existing Las Condes residents.298  A document dated December 
1965 furthered the incorporation of the neighborhood, now described as a “satellite zone.”  It 
was agreed CORVI would finance construction on the land, and that the 250 people would be 
organized into four cooperatives; the document referenced the General Building and 
Construction Ordinance as its rationale.299   
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Figure 6.3.  Las Condes addition (MINVU Archives, author’s photograph) 
 
In a document signed by Juan Parrochia and intended for the “Lead Architect” at the 
MINVU, he requested affordable housing be located on Avenue Las Condes, in front of 
Fernández Concha.300  People like Parrochia had their eyes on large swathes of empty 
aristocratic land, as it appeared foolish to let it sit there unused, given that both the rural and 
urban poor were traditionally encouraged by the government to stakeout unused land.301   In 
perspective this was a controversial request that implicated the general polarized class struggles 
of Chilean society.  Parrochia utilized the speculative plans for Las Condes and the 1960 census 
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301 For example, the “back to the land” scheme discussed above, or as part of the 1940s and 50s 
land reform policies, where instead of redistribution the landowning aristocrats advocated for the 
poor finding their own plots of vacant land, which frequently had no potential for growing 
anything, see Wright, Land Owners and Reform in Chile. 
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to showcase empty land in a low-density community sparsely populated by the middle and upper 
classes whose “…population can be tripled within those same limits.”302  He envisioned the land 
could accommodate another 300,000 inhabitants, and that it would be relatively easy to provide 
these people with utilities, once they were concentrated in the neighborhood.303  For Parrochia, it 
was common people who displayed more potential when it came to “geometric progression.”304  
He wrote of communities that evidenced his assertions: “As an example it would suffice to visit 
the illegal and unhealthy population that carried out the Municipality of Las Condes in the case 
of the Mapocho River in this same sector, and another irregular population established along of 
this same river between Centenario Avenue and the Polo Club.”305 
However, the well-off residents of Las Condes learned early on that they could defend 
their interests, for example the class or racial character of the neighborhood, via the same types 
of actions and policies benefitting the poor.  In February 1966, the mayor of Las Condes wrote 
the Director of Planning at the Ministry of Public Works, this time calling for the incorporation 
of houses considered tolerable and the eradication of those that were undesirable.306  The 
neighborhoods of Puente Nuevo, San Enrique, and San Antonio, Vidal suggested, should be 
incorporated into Las Condes.307  These three areas were selected for their solid construction, as 
“…those which already have good buildings do not affect the future tracings of parks, nor 
                                                     
302 MINVU Archives. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 As noted with the Hippodromo in San Miguel, the polo grounds attracted slum quarters, 
perhaps as they necessitated labor.  Parrochia expected future canalization and covering of that 
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Ibid. 
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avenues and previously established remodeling of the existing...”308 The land was to be given to 
a “…group of appreciable communal workers…” who already lived there.309  The middle and 
upper class approached planning in a way that appealed to the MINVU goals but contradicted the 
struggles of the poor: for example, they supported professionals (many of whom were their 
friends and relatives) in their quest for rationality and efficiency in order to skirt equality and 
redistribution, even though architects protested that the poor had more potential for order.  Only 
some of the satellite communities materialized, such as that of Puente Nuevo, which existed on 
land primarily owned by Suc. Max. Ibáñez.310  The 1960s were radicalized and progressive 
enough that it was not farfetched to trust the poor to engage in orderly planning and construction, 
even in a suburb with the reputation of Las Condes. 
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Table 6.2.  MINVU Study of Housing in 60 Communities 
 
(Source: MINVU Archives) 
 MINVU took as its mission gathering comprehensive statistics on housing and 
construction, as had become technocratic custom across the board internationally for planners of 
this time.  In a study of 60 comunas scattered throughout the country, MINVU tracked the 
number of homes built and total construction costs of both the private and public sectors during 
the decade.  The category public sector depicted construction by any of the state-run 
organizations, mostly CORVI and CORHABIT.  The data was gathered from the institutions 
themselves.  The column labeled private sector showed construction not financed by the state, 
 101 
 
and the numbers were gathered through municipal registries by observing building permits.311  
Self-help homes, as has been evidenced here, were built with construction materials delivered by 
either outside corporations (as in the U.S. company cited or Sert) or the Chilean state, thus 
ostensibly they are included in both columns.  The archival material does not shed light on 
alternative methods for incentivizing housing construction, such as through tax breaks; the wide 
scope of the umbrella term private would encompass such efforts. 
 The numbers suggest that both the private and public sectors contributed about an equal 
amount of housing in the 1960s.  The data gathered revealed some advantages of the multi-
pronged response to the shortage that included pressuring the private sector into providing 
homes, though ultimately it exposed clear flaws with the scale of Chilean housing programs.  
The private and public sectors consistently through these years invested most of their 
construction costs (about 75 to 80 percent) on housing.  This other portion was either spent on 
office, retail, and industrial buildings; or parks, roads, stadiums, etc.  The private sector steadily 
increased its production of homes through the decade, while state-sponsored projects usually 
corresponded to U.S. aidfor example, in 1965, when the public sector saw a huge spike in 
spending and homes constructed.  The data implies that overall Chile was making slow progress 
on its housing problem.312  Rounding up, in the 1960s both private and public sources provided 
about 300,000 homes (some of whose beneficiaries might have been middle class) throughout 
the whole country.  There was a shortage of about 450,000 in Santiago alone at the beginning of 
                                                     
311 Ibid. 
312 The above table does not represent complete numbers for the country, which are in fact higher 
than the above cited numbers.  For example, in 1965 the study and the publicly-funded homes 
nationwide differ by about 5,000 units, making the above numbers suitable for making 
generalized assessments of the number of homes built, see Table A.3 in Appendix A: Tables. 
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the decade, making an increase in the shortage to nearly 600,000 at the beginning of the 1970s 
foreseeable. 
 MINVU centered its efforts on squatters and the homeless, who were regularly 
transferred to CORVI and self-help homes throughout the 1960s, but this did not manage to 
approach solving the housing crisis by any means.  The prioritization of the poor proved more 
hortatory in nature than practical, as there was a very limited number of homes available.  Some 
poorer people did upgrade their homes, though this was restricted to a small vocal population 
who could spare the time, labor, and money to pester officials via bureaucratic channels.  
Beneficiaries of public housing in previous decades were ensured a reliable transition into the 
new arrangement, as people rightly fretted over the possibility of invalidated titles and 
backpedaling on gains.  Class divisions, however, were not magically erased once poor areas 
were included on a government map, and many lower-income people who merged into upscale 
neighborhoods, like Las Condes, felt the repercussions after establishing their properties legally.  
In resolute yet still anemic fashion, the 1960s continued the trends of Chilean affordable housing 
of previous decades.   
 
ALPRO Crumbles, Chileans Recover 
 
The contradictions of economic aid and the social programs it produced in the late 1960s 
eventually thwarted the entire effort, ripping it apart at the seams: the aims of ALPRO and the 
IMF were not for Latin American economies to comprehensively recover, but rather just enough 
to repay loans and to further open countries to foreign business interests.  The flow of dollars 
stimulated housing and construction but could not prevent radicalization, frustrating impatient 
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capitalists.  The Chilean government simultaneously advocated for social programs while 
exercising its power to contain.  For example, when workers organized and seized their 
workplaces during strikes at two Anaconda copper mines, the state intervened.  The crackdown 
resulted in the arrest of 800 and death of 22 people.313  The Frei administration took some steps 
toward nationalizing industries, but marched police into the mines, factories, and shanties at the 
first sign of a threat.      
In 1966 alone U.S. aid totaled $112 million.  The U.S. ambassador, Ralph Dungan, took a 
hands-on approach, working in Santiago slums with residents in self-help assembly.314  However 
the situation was beyond repair, as even President Frei, the beneficiary of ALPRO propaganda, 
had become disillusioned.  In a 1967 Foreign Affairs article he declared that the “Alliance had 
lost its way” and that assistance favored elites over those in need.315  The IMF and World Bank 
responded that austerity measures should be adopted, including cutting public housing, but Chile 
instead rejected U.S. aid altogether, taking issue with Yankee intervention in the Dominican 
Republic and Peru.316  As a result the Christian Democrats were forced to drastically cut their 
budget in 1967, though home construction did not bear the brunt of it.317  
In the late 1960s, leaders of government bodies resigned from their posts in acts of 
protest.  Influential Catholic figures withdrew their support for Eduardo Frei and the Christian 
Democrats when they noticed a lack of results as to the poor, specifically those who had lived 
                                                     
313 The two U.S.-owned copper giants in Chile were both started in Salt Lake City, Anaconda 
(Standard Oil subsidiary) and Kennecott (owner of the world’s largest copper mine, El Teniente), 
see Michaels, “The Alliance for Progress and Chile’s ‘Revolution in Liberty,’” 89. 
314 Ibid., 85. 
315 Ibid., 88. 
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317 Murphy, For a Proper Home, 88. 
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and spent time amongst the poblaciones.318  The general population followed suit, voting for 
more radical and progressive alternatives.  The PDC fell particularly short when it came to its 
promises for land reform.  Frei was stuck navigating a delicate balancehe was losing support 
from the more radical and progressive elements for not doing enough and attempting to keep 
order through violent crackdowns, while simultaneously fending off U.S. interests and demands.  
Chile had urbanized at an astounding rate, generating unprecedented homelessness in its 
cities by the 1970s.  The housing crisis could only be solved through comprehensive economic 
reform that prioritized equality, as well as the perpetuation of localized social programs.  Frei 
made a valiant effort with ALPRO and other assistance; his administration constructed about 
228,398 units during his six years, falling short of a stated goal of 360,000.  However, many of 
those who benefitted were not the most marginalized, as his administration provided only 
121,000 of the 213,000 houses projected to be needed by low-income residents.319  Murphy 
concludes that this was largely due to pressure from the influential private Chilean Chamber of 
Construction.  This housing deficit had risen to 585,000 by 1970.320  In short, Salvador Allende 
inherited a nearly unmanageable situation from Frei. 
 
Zenith of Land Invasions 
 
Self-help, Operación Sitio, Popular Promotion, programs intended to dampen 
radicalization and public discontent, in many ways energized common people to do exactly the 
                                                     
318 Bouvier, Alliance or Compliance, 31. Between late 1967 and early 1968, the Diocesan Synod 
of Santiago announced that the church would focus on social justice, in harmony with Vatican II, 
see Hutchison, Labors Appropriate to their Sex, 140. 
319 Murphy, For a Proper Home, 88. 
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opposite, specifically in the sense that the actions encouraged bore a remarkable similarity to 
squatting, land invasions, and building shanties from found materials.  In the middle of the 
decade, about 50 percent of the pobladores were unemployed.321  Between 1963 and 1967 places 
like La Granja to the south of downtown and Conchalí to the north became important 
battlegrounds for the land invasion movement.322  The narrative of the late 1960s became 
dominated by leftist pobladores, their conquered tomas serving as centers of culture and music, 
as with the Campamento Violeta Parra, named after the famous populist folk singer.323  
All eyes were on the powder keg as it unfolded in public parks, unoccupied vineyards, 
and in the backyards of the elite; small numbers of people made an immense impact on policy.  
The most famous 1960s land invasion took place in the middle of the night in Renca on March 
16 1967, led by Gladys Marín and the Barrancas homeless committees.324  The pobladores were 
countered by police tear gas and water cannons, in what amounted to a seven-hour battle.325  The 
squatters’ struggle built the neighborhood of Herminda de la Victoria, named after a baby that 
died of sickness during the cold of night.326  Two and a half months later the Christian 
Democrats made a deal with the bellicose homeless, and, conducting a survey through the 
Ministry of Interior, enrolled 642 of the 1,098 families in state housing programs.327  Residents 
agreed to provide their own labor to construct their new community’s infrastructure and utilities.   
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There was no slowing down the drive for affordable housing and land invasions.  This 
was buttressed by a sophisticated culture of architecture and planning, as well as organized 
working and lower classes, accustomed to the air of progressivism and leftism.  Despite Frei’s 
rejection of ALPRO, in 1968, after having funds withheld as a penalty, Chile opened back up to 
U.S. investments, receiving $846 million;328 though the same year land seizures in Santiago 
spiked to a high of 27 for the year.329  By 1969 CORHABIT estimated that 45,000 people needed 
“housing solutions,” totaling 23,000 units.330   
Land invasions were violently repressed at the end of the decade, contrasting with the 
tolerance and even acclaim given them by some members of the political establishment.  In early 
1969 the army invaded a squatter settlement in the southern city of Puerto Montt, killing 11 
homeless and injuring 70 with gunfire, setting off a chain of discontent.331  Disgusted, the 
homeless orchestrated between 73 and 148 land seizures in response to the violence in 1969.  
Poblaciones were named after leftist figures like Marx, Lenin, Che, and Angela Davis.332  One of 
the most revered invasions was the May 1st establishment of Población Primero de Mayo, when 
Renca’s homeless committee prepared a march from the Communist Party headquarters to 
Recabarren, where they camped out on a portion of a vineyard.333  Five days of police occupation 
followed, during which time only food, water, and temporary shelter materials were allowed into 
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the encampment.334  On May 5 one hundred protesters moved from Renca to the steps of the 
governor’s building, amazingly succeeding in having the homeless committees elevated to a 
neighborhood council, and in turn attaining access to government architects and planners.335  
Murphy elaborates that for Renca “…MINVU organized the campamento into ten distinct 
sections, which eventually became city blocks.  Each committee of the homeless occupied a 
different block, following a common practice that preserved the neighborhood identity that the 
pobladores had before the land seizure.336”  The back and forth was fraught with physical danger, 
but even in this precarious context the poor and their champions proved unwavering.  The 
grinding process was surprisingly effective despite obvious flaws, prefiguring the progressive 
1970s, when significant strides would be made against homelessness. 
 
Housing and Architecture of the Late 1960s 
 
The homes of the 1960s revealed the ambitions of the radicalized public.  Construction 
increased with U.S. aid, but still could not scale with the explosive urbanization, as that was not 
materially possible.  Now homes were packaged as mass earthquake-resistant concrete boxes, 
which was cost-effective and satisfied both the demands of Chilean professionals (quickly 
morphing into leftists) as well as U.S. consultants.  Chileans once again considered investing in 
foreign professionals: correspondence at the end of 1962 took place between Chilean architect 
Sergio Larraín and Paul Lester Weiner, wherein the former sought to acquire technical assistance 
to build a 20-story plus multi-use project in the central plaza in Viña del Mar (which would 
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include in substantial part, affordable workers housing, as required of construction companies 
under Chilean law).337  Lower income housing was encouraged by law, and, despite the 
pervasive presence of foreign lending, protectionist policies remained in place to safeguard 
national interests.  In this instance a potential contract with Sert and Wiener disintegrated due to 
investment constraints.  It illustrates, however, the adventurousness of the Chilean government 
and the willingness to invest funds in eminent leaders in the planning and architecture fields. 
 
 
Figure 6.4.  Villa Frei, 1965-68, by Jaime and Osvaldo Larraín and Diego Balmaceda (Source: 
http://www.arquibus.cl/en/227-oriente/villa-presidente-frei/) 
 
Avant-garde and modernist architects, the product of educational reforms in the 1940s 
and 50s, and eager for a chance to display the value of their techniques, seized opportunities to 
design countless apartment complexes in the 1960s.  CORVI sponsored several modernist 
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housing projects in the early part of the decade, such as the 1960 to 1963 Olympic Village, 
Santiago, which “…was based on large blocks within which courtyards were formed.”338  It 
housed about 1,000 to 2,000 people.339  Other bodies like CORMU (the Corporation of Urban 
Improvement) created in 1965, sponsored a large percentage of the modernist projects in 
Santiago between 1966 and 1976, but explicitly favored the middle class.340  The organization 
ran parallel and often in partnership with MINVU. Projects, such as the remodeling of the San 
Borja neighborhood, in turn, were inspired by CORVI and CORHABIT.341  Villa Frei (1965-68), 
depicted above, stands out as a sample of Chilean modernism, echoing Le Corbusier and other 
modernists with its noticeable zig-zagging outdoor staircases.  Architects maximized the 
potential use of materials and space, as both were scarce.  The city was once again extended 
upward; structures were erected to be monumental, representative of the communal struggle. The 
poor were to live vertically, to abandon single-family houses for multi-family apartments. 
Emilio Duhart was one of the most distinguished architects to emerge from this class of 
Chilean modernists.  He completed a master’s degree under the influential modernist Walter 
Gropius at Harvard, and then became the Director of the Institute of Urban and Housing 
Planning in Santiago from 1953 to 1960.342  In 1960 he was awarded the chance to design the 
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United Nations CEPAL building in Santiago, which was completed in 1966, with the assistance 
Brazilian landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx, who planned the surrounding park.343  The 
building is still celebrated internationally as an outstandingly brilliant piece of Latin American 
architecture. 
Duhart explained the peculiar nature of Chilean architecture and planning in a 1969 
interview following a UNESCO meeting in Argentina; while he had the opportunity to design the 
CEPAL building, he shared with most Chilean architects an inability to specialize in one type of 
architecture.344  Duhart relayed an explicit take on low-income housing, especially within the 
context of Chile, which he considered ‘advanced’ among Latin American countries, along with 
Argentina:   
“In the case of a public building, I think the architect makes himself, as in the traditional 
sense of the word, a true creator, an organizer of the functional, plastic, and 
constructional space.  He really is the person in charge of the construction.  In the case of 
housing projects I think the architect should be more of an urbanist, an organizer of the 
projects, than a designer of the house itself.  I believe that, going back to a tradition that’s 
as old as cities itself, the houses should be built by the people who are going to live in 
them, and we should tend towards that, not because of a sort of populism, not only 
because of a sentimental populism, but because of simple logic and reason.”345 
 
Duhart showcased a Chilean architecture practice with decades of affordable housing 
projects experience.  He noted problems with mechanical inhuman apartments and cities, but did 
not see himself as opposing the likes of Le Corbusier, who he pointed out understood this need 
for self-construction in Algeria, as well as a Dutch group exploring similar issues.346  The idea 
that housing and planning were inseparable was commonly agreed upon by Chileans.  Decades 
of proficiency with planning and architecture, paired with a progressive political context, primed 
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Chile’s professionals for a bold approach to affordable housing.  Adaptiveness and effectiveness 
was paramount.  Residential buildings were only there to serve the residents, so, for Duhart, an 
architect was to be a selfless tool of the people.   
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Conclusion 
 
To achieve development, industrialization, and a modern centralized state, the Chilean 
economy needed to locate natural resources and create industries to generate products for the 
global market.  To those ends the Chilean elite and state pursued settler colonialism and 
expansion, yielding new territory and resource-rich lands.  Initially the economy relied on 
nitrates and copper in the north, and in contemporary times in the south on the timber and fishing 
industries on land of the native Mapuche.   
The explosive growth of mining in turn promoted infrastructure and urbanization.  
Chilean cities formed along the routes by which copper and nitrates left the country.  Santiago 
and Valparaíso became the country’s economic nucleus.  Rural dwellers flooded into this central 
urban zone throughout the twentieth century in search of opportunities, however scarce.  In 1930 
after the depression and crash of the saltpeter industry, even miners packed up for the Santiago-
Valparaíso area.  At that time two thirds of the nation’s population still lived in rural areas, 
where landlords reigned over huge agricultural plots exploiting native-descended inquilinos (a 
situation that continued well into the 1960s and 70s).  But again, by 1970 two thirds of the 
population lived in cities, reversing these ratios.   
Incentives led the wealthy and politicians to build or buy tenement-style conventillos.  
Landlords squeezed high rents out of the poor, and especially new migrants, while returning little 
in maintenance, utilities, or other services.  Those unable to afford rent settled in makeshift 
shanties, first as ranchos along the Mapocho river, and later as pobladores invading large 
swathes of land who pitched up tents and constructed shacks, making their own unofficial claims 
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of ownership.  Just as the availability of jobs could not adequately sustain the population, 
housing could not nearly maintain pace with its swelling ranks.     
Urban Chileans nevertheless proved themselves to be imaginative and ambitious in the 
face of such limitations.  The development of middle and professional classes, although they 
often maintained close relationships with the old aristocracy and shared kinship ties with it, 
resulted in stronger representation of the poor masses and consideration of their basic needs.  
Workers who formed unions and went on strike were emboldened and supported by popular 
opinion, and in turn carved out an influential voice for their causes.  Grassroots organizations 
like neighborhood committees, women’s clinics, and even soccer teams also substantially 
reflected the needs of their communities. 
Populism and radicalism flourished, making serious electoral gains and demanding social 
assistance programs.  Liberation theology unabashedly promoted the struggle of the poor.  
Reform broke through the constraints of those initially who promoted it, if only for purposes of 
maintaining the status quo of power and wealth.  Influential sections of the elite increasingly 
turned toward development and social programs as a way of quelling popular discontent among 
the masses.  At the heart of these efforts was development of adequate housing.   Related efforts 
involved connecting all city dwellers to public utilities like potable water, electricity and 
transportation (as is vital to modernization), as well as sunlight, air, green public space, etc. 
The idea that the state, with the assistance of private investors and organizations, could 
feasibly put a roof over every family and otherwise adequately attend to the basic residential 
needs of all seemed entirely plausible to Chileans in the middle of the twentieth century.  Viewed 
through a contemporary lens these ambitions appear utopian, but an impressive history of 
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housing efforts suggests otherwise.  This optimism was understandably partly rescinded when 
the realities of dependence and the globalizing economy set in around the middle of the century, 
not to mention the actions imperial forces used to defend a capitalist world vision.  Between 
1920 and 1973 housing assistance bodies and laws in Chile (including MINVU, CORVI, 
CORMU, CORHABIT, Operación Sitio, U.S.-backed self-help, and others) made striking 
progress in their capabilities for building and repairing homes.  Initiatives were slow to gain 
steam, but as early as the 1950s the results of the decades-long commitment were evident in 
thousands of new houses.  By the 1970s, in Allende’s three years, the nation was arguably on 
track to largely eliminate urban housing shortages. 
Although aspirations repeatedly far outmatched material possibilities and budgetary 
constraints, Chilean professionals took to heart the struggle of the poor.  Planners and architects 
sincerely adopted the mission of ending housing shortages and inadequate living conditions.  
This type of utopic thinking made more reasonable gains plausible, as demanding the most 
comprehensive societal reforms resulted in more success than complying with minimally 
progressive proposals. 
A strong correlation between developments in the Chilean professions of architecture and 
urban planning and the general political climate of the county existed, meaning that as 
progressivism, reformism, and radicalism made gains so did the capabilities and resources of 
technical experts.  At the same time the government sought to replace what was once informal 
growth with government planning.   
Schools of thought within professions adopted technocratic approaches to poverty that 
implicitly suggested technique alone could conquer housing deficiencies.  Chileans turned to 
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importing technical assistance from abroad early in the twentieth century.  They adopted the 
most innovative international practices, albeit filtered through the constraints of on-the-ground 
conditions.  Urban design and modernism became the standard by the late 1960s, the most useful 
tools for attacking housing shortages and problems of urbanization.        
While expressly aiming to assist poor residents, in practice planning under liberal 
capitalist structures segregated Santiago along class lines.  Zoning and placement of affordable 
housing channeled the poor away from downtown to expansive poor suburbs.  The rich 
established their own communities not far from the city center to the east and north, now a 
landscape dominated by luxury shopping and security complexes.  The physical reshaping of 
cities, both intentionally and unintentionally, located barriers between the classes in the forms of 
freeways, parks, canals, train lines, etc.   
The reformism of the early 1960s did not yield the results intended by foreign capitalists 
and ALPRO funders or the Chilean elite and sections of the middle class; indeed, instead of 
preventing discontent and activism the program provoked and encouraged it.  Even Frei himself 
admitted to its failure.  The poor, however, seized the moment and made monumental gains in 
standard of living.  Land invasions in this era evidenced a clear trend that the pobladores did not 
intend to give up their relentless quest for adequate housing.  They did not even abide by the 
Marxist Allende’s plea for an end to the overnight encampments.  
The Chilean history of affordable housing, shanties, squatting, and land invasions 
exemplified the possibilities of radical and progressive movements to make material gains within 
adverse capitalist contexts.  Sadly, if not perhaps predictably, the democratic choice made in 
Chile to embrace a move toward real equality was met with organized violence by reactionary 
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forces.  Conservatives and moderates organized to refuse socialism, as evidenced by the 
glorification of Pinochet still espoused by some in contemporary times.347  Furthermore, the 
United States’ view of Chile as fundamental to the ideological defeat of radicalism in Latin 
America, and globally, led to its backing of the collapse, and in turn establishing a trend of 
funding neoliberal governments and outright ruthless dictatorships in other parts of the world to 
prevent leftist threats. 
The demand for adequate urban housing is however not a mere artifact of those times.  It 
remains an issue of burning importance given the contemporary state of global megacities and 
their miles and miles of slums.  Chile itself still struggles with shanties and homelessnesstake 
for instance the ever-present threat of fire wiping out the sheds lining the hills of Valparaíso.  
One can hope that fragments of the prior Chilean devotion and optimism for providing affordable 
housing have outlasted the victory of anticommunists and a nearly complete withdrawal of 
interest in housing the poor on the part of financiers and the state. This long struggle is not a 
closed book.  
 Similarly, the techniques adopted in Chile to combat housing shortages and inadequacies 
over forty years ago should remain entirely relevant to these lingering and unsolved problems. 
The adoption by experts over decades of advanced methods for constructing affordable and 
adequate housing hopefully likewise have also outlasted neoliberalism’s starving of housing 
assistance for the poor. 
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Epilogue: Allende through Today 
 
Salvador Allende’s administration (1970-73) remained committed to the housing and 
land reform promises of his predecessors, while encouraging additional experimentation within 
the planning and architecture community.  Affordable housing gained strength with ALPRO 
funds and blossomed even further during the short Allende presidency, as his government 
invested trust, confidence, resources, and labor in technocratic professionals. 
Table 7.1.  Population growth in Santiago and in the suburb of Renca 
 
(Source: Murphy, For a Proper Home, 59) 
Table 7.2.  Percentage of Chileans living in cities 
 
(Source: González Arriagada, “Surviving in the City,” 47) 
Between 1952 and 1970 more than half a million Chileans had moved to Santiago,348 and 
most were women and children.  About 3.5 million women and 3.2 million men lived in cities in 
1970.349  Out of a workforce of 3,189,000 only 191,000 were unemployed,350 but many still 
could not find homes.  The central urban corridor around Santiago consisted of densely 
populated semi-urban shanties, an area of rampant poverty rather than a single-family paradise.  
For instance, in November 1970, as Salvador Allende was being inaugurated, as many as 
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300,000 still lived in Santiago shanties.351  In the 1970s, poor residents continued local 
organizing, working to secure housing rights, and erecting structures and claiming land as their 
own.  Allende responded.  Under the Popular Unity government in 1970 MINVU contracted for 
upwards of 73,000 new houses, while CORVI planned for another 30,000.352  The new 
administration sought a complete overhaul of the city and the eradication for good of 
homelessness.  
Grassroots organizing, moreover, gained even more importance in the Allende years.  
Neighborhoods were molded with the input and counseling of local organizations.  A meeting 
representing eastern San Miguel in October of 1971, a group composed of “…fifteen 
cooperatives, eighty mothers’ centers, eight women’s groups, eighteen sports clubs, four primary 
schools, and a Christian parish,”353 epitomized such efforts.  Community-decided plans were 
transferred up the chain of command without being lost in a bureaucratic vortex.   
The Allende government nationalized copper and seized banks in 1970, bringing access 
to credit, and enabling the government to distribute extensive amounts of housing loans.  The 
government pointed to the 40,000 living in the mud in Santiago as its rationale for emergency 
measures.354  Residents needed more than simply housing, so actions were taken under Allende 
to deliver milk and clothing, and to build needed infrastructure.355  Even with such expanded 
capabilities and efforts, the housing shortage still increased to 800,000 by the end of his term.356  
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The material situation in Chile worsened in the 1970s, a collapse that economic planners were 
forced to watch run its course, try as they might to control it. 
Several groups were not content with the new government and made their opposition 
known.  Marxist parties to the left of Allende stepped up their struggles.  The MIR 
(Revolutionary Left Movement) and the “maximalists,” for example, pushed their agendas in the 
shanties and poblaciones.357  The MIR coordinated an invasion in the middle-class Las Condes 
neighborhood during the Allende years.358  Brand new apartment towers intended for the middle 
class were seized and repurposed shortly after completion, or at times before.  This was a bold 
challenge to the continuation of class divisions as they manifested physically.   
Land invasions and demonstrations did not end during Popular Unity but rather 
increased.  Between 1970 and 1973 invasions increased tenfold, accounting for a quarter of the 
Santiago shanty populationabout 300,000 to 400,000.359  Residents familiar with the living 
standards promised in the Frei years demanded nothing less, such as in 1970 in the May Day 
campamento, when residents chanted “let’s move on up” in protesting apartment downgrades.360  
By the time Allende called for an end to all land seizures, they were common practice: 14 
percent of the population participated in them between 1967 and 1973 (279,000 people).361  
There were 560 land seizures between 1970 and 1971, with 350 staged in Santiago itself.  A land 
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seizure was organized nearly every day for a year.362  The avalanche of new arrivals largely 
stunted the progress that was in motion or had been previously achieved. 
 
 
Figure 7.1.  Open City (source: http://www.barqo.cl/v1/proyecto.php?tipo=275) 
 
By the late 1960s most notable Chilean architects were undeniably modern; by the early 
1970s they were devising their own avant-garde aesthetics that posed challenges and pushed 
boundaries.  Alberto Cruz and his Ciudad Abierta (Open City) group were awarded a blank plot 
in Ritoque about fifteen miles outside of Valparaíso, where the team was encouraged to 
materialize their desire to instill architecture with a poetic sensibility.363  The project had been 
planned as a 270-hectare project along two miles of sand dunes along the Pacific shoreline, and 
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was initiated as far back as 1969.364  As Pérez de Arce explains: “There is not a master plan for 
the Open City, but rather a concatenation of schemes devised within the horizon of a ‘non-plan.’  
Yet each act of construction heeds the particularity of its setting.”365  It was imagined as a fluid 
city, able to adapt to and learn from the wishes of its inhabitants.  Ciudad Abierta took as its 
principle the grassroots bottom-up methods promoted under Frei and Allende. 
Prefabrication remained a popular concept in Chile in the 1970s.  Soviet influence, 
support, and aid was present, but limited.  Brezhnev offered Allende the same benefits given to 
Cuba.366  This included machines like cement mixers, and even an entire prefabricated housing 
factory.367  The Soviets actively attempted to export a method of prefabrication used for housing 
blocks to the country, but it did not take hold.368  There were several other Chilean attempts at 
prefabricated housing techniques under Allende, such as a program run out of an abandoned 
Citroën Chile SA factory, and another that utilized wooden frames with composite panels, but 
these floundered quickly.369   
In 1971 Allende asked the head architects of CORMU, Miguel Lawner and Jorge Wong, 
to design a building for UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). 
The project had to be hurried to meet the scheduled date of May 1972 for the conference.370  
Architect José Medina was sent to Paris and New York to work with UN architects, in an effort 
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to guarantee that the new structure had a cohesive look.371  The UNCTAD project transformed 
several city blocks in the northern San Borja region of Santiago, and included the addition of 
twelve new CORMU-owned residential towers.372  The UNCTAD building has been described 
as “Brutalist” in style, massive and undecorated.373  A worker shared his feelings on the 
UNCTAD project: “‘It makes me proud, comrade, that in Chile we build luxurious things, and 
workers do not have to show an ID at the entrance.  But one cannot feel like the owner of this 
huge mass, because one arrives home at night to a cabin in a shantytown, and it has always been 
like this.’”374  Poverty remained ubiquitous, even though such communal projects inspired 
solidarity in everyday people.   
Organizations like CORMU that had frequently benefitted middle sectors of society were 
repurposed for constructing monumental socialist architecture.  For the Allende administration, 
the rebooting of downtown Santiago was inseparable from housing the squatters.  The same 
funding of forward-thinking buildings like the UNCTAD building was applied to apartments.  In 
1972 a competition was held for a plan to renovate the Santiago city center.  As Liernur portrays 
it, the aim was “…to create housing for eighty thousand people, including the former settlers of 
the area and the working people living in shantytowns in the city and in the encampments at is 
outskirts.  Construction of the winning entry, an ambitious urban network influenced by the idea 
of CIAM Team X, was interrupted, however, by the military coup…”375 In the same year the city 
hosted the VIEXPO international housing exhibition, which included a competition for the west-
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central area of Santiago.376  Near the end of Allende’s term the shanties lingered and the state 
increased its attention to the problem.  
U.S.-backed military general Augusto Pinochet and his followers partnered with the 
Christian Democrats to engineer an economic crisis, including manufactured food shortages.377  
Notoriously, the Nixon sought to “make the economy scream.”  In October of 1972 the head of 
the Chilean Truck Owners’ Association called for a strike, freezing the circulation of goods.378  
The coup took place in June1973.  At that time the rich in Las Condes had been surrounded by 
the poor on all sides, provoking the wealthy into organizing committees for neighborhood 
defense.379  Once Pinochet’s forces took control, the military stormed into the shanties.  The 
residents, hardened and radicalized from decades of experience protesting, fought back between 
1973 and 1983 “…digging trenches, erecting burning barricades, and pelting military tanks with 
rocks…”380 Poor neighborhoods like Herminda de la Victoria, La Lengua, Cerro Navia, and La 
Pincoya were mobilized and militant.381    
While the poor tirelessly opposed Pinochet during the two decades of the dictatorship, 
they were consistently denied ground.  Chile adopted neoliberal reforms beginning in the mid-
1970s, which set the standard of cutting government projects and deemphasizing government 
hindrances on private business.382  With the coup urban reconstruction and housing construction 
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in the slums was put on hold.  The governments that followed Pinochet, while perhaps not 
outwardly hostile to the poor, did little to restore housing programs.383  This situation has 
undergone little change to the present.  
MINVU, suffering through forty years of market-friendly administrations, ended up a 
husk of its former self.  Marcelo Zunino depicts the organization as leaning heavily on the 
private sector, as with its promotion in 2001 of the “Great Urban Reform.”384  In the end, 
government policies fostered a context where the divide between private and public was blurry, 
allowing for private, moneyed interests to dominate most planning initiatives.385  Political and 
social implications are tossed aside under this style of Santiago planning; what remains is a 
brittle skeleton of technocratic and scientific solutions.386  MINVU’s contemporary approach to 
planning involves the creation of centralized administrative posts.  Their appointees are 
ultimately reduced to convincing private investors to finance projects.387  In this way the private 
sector dominates planning, aside from the single aspect of social housing, which is still the 
domain of MINVU.   
The results of market-directed planning have been drastic, and lacking in significant 
aesthetic value, to say the least.  In Santiago poverty is still rampant.  The rich and middle class 
have resorted to fortifying themselves behind gates, security cameras, and doormen, usually on 
the northern end of the city or in newly created suburbs.  As Borsdorf, Hidalgo, and Vidal-
Koppmann reveal: “These are called barrios cerrados, urbanizaciones cerradas or condiminios 
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and always feature walls and fences and a central entrance gate, often watch towers, 24-h 
security staff, CCTV, pass control and other systems.”388  The staff for such compounds, as 
expected, is recruited from the neighbors just outside their limits.389  Borsdorf, Hidalgo, and 
Vidal-Koppmann point to a 1980 decree, which essentially allowed for the bulk sale of 
agricultural plots to be subdivided and converted into fenced-in luxury condos.  Many of these 
sprang up in the western and southern regions of Santiago.390  They write: “Between 1994 and 
2002 a total of 156,251 parcelas were created in c. 7500 fenced-in estates.”391  Satellite towns 
like Pedra Roja, Valle Grande, Valle Norte, and La Reserva were designed to be entirely 
exclusive to upper-class residents.392   
Social housing under Pinochet and subsequent governments has been concentrated at the 
periphery of the city, forcing the poor further and further out of view.393  Peruvian immigrants 
have become the new lower class in much of Santiago, with the men working and living in the 
city center, and the women primarily working and even living as domestic servants in rich 
neighborhoods like Las Condes.394  The privatization of communal space extends beyond the 
gated neighborhoods and out into the countless shopping centers, what Borsdorf, Hidalgo, and 
Vidal-Koppmann deem “urban entertainment centres.”  For example, the Costanera Center in 
Providencia that towers above the whole city of Santiago, and from what I was told is the largest 
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mall in South America.395  This trio of authors describes how the rich grew fond of the bohemian 
charm of the lower-class Bellavista neighborhoodpacked with bars, clubs, and cheap Peruvian 
foodeven taking up residence in the Lastarria quarter just across the river.396   
 
 
Figure 7.2.  Aravena’s half homes (Source: 
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/565483296932034468/) 
 
Out of the mélange of luxury condos and gated suburbs has emerged the internationally 
celebrated architect Alejandro Aravena, who has carried the torch for both modernism and 
affordable housing in Chile.  Aravena’s comments in a 2016 New York Times article by Michael 
Kimmelman suggest the architect sees Chile’s unique situation as having frozen his profession in 
time, to positive results.  Kimmelman writes, quoting Aravena: “We were saved from 
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postmodernism,” Aravena told me.  “By default, we were left to find our own identity.  Our 
professors were practitioners, not theorists, who taught how to get buildings built.  It was, in 
retrospect, a very useful education.’”397  Left to their own devices, without the dismantling of 
modernism, technocratic neoliberal conditions in Chile have preserved a sentiment lost in much 
the rest of the world.  Aravena prioritizes the needs of the poor and keeps alive Chilean traditions 
of prefabrication and self-help.  His company ELEMENTAL builds “half-houses.”  The homes 
are equipped with essentials in a concrete or brick shella bathroom, kitchen, etc.with room 
for the building of new rooms when the residents have the money.398  The residents do just this, 
filling out the second half of the house with whatever materials they can get their hands on, and 
completing the homes with their own personal styles.399  Aravena’s approach has been criticized 
in many of the same ways modernist mass housing of the past has been.  At the same time, the 
recognition he receives implies these debates over how best to house the urban poor have not 
necessarily been settled. 
Chile’s fondness for the modernist past should be a reminder of a time when 
ambitiousness and inventiveness were encouraged, a time when “ending homelessness” was not 
some farfetched dream, but a practical approach to ameliorate a scientifically observed problem. 
One can only hope that the residue of the robust social housing that developed in Chile will pay 
some future dividends to the poor and society over all.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Tables 
Table A.1.  Strikes by City 
 
(Source: DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 165-166, see tables 6.1 and 6.3) 
Table A.2.  Strikes by Profession, 1920s 
 
(DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 165-66) 
Table A.3.  Countrywide Construction of Homes in the 1960s. 
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(Source: MINVU Archives) 
 
Table A.4.  Homes by Month in 1965 
 
 
(Source: MINVU Archives) 
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Table A.5.  Homes by Month in the Late 1960s 
 
 131 
 
 
(Source: MINVU Archives) 
 
 
Appendix B: Names 
 
Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna Vicuña completely reshaped Santiago in the 1870s using Paris as 
a model and echoing 1853, when Napoleon III hired Georges-Eugène Haussmann to broaden 
Paris streets, opening them up to sunlight and creating more sanitary conditions.400  
 
Carlos Carvajal In 1906 Carlos Carvajal Miranda was named Inspector General of Architecture 
in the Chilean Public Works Department, and was tasked with “…designing inexpensive, 
earthquake-proof workers’ housing.”401  For Chilean planners like Carvajal, sanitation, housing, 
and neatly planned cities were intrinsically linked.  Between 1910 and 1912 he championed the 
Society for Inexpensive Housing for Employees’, a never-materialized million-dollar project for 
“Los Leones,” envisioned as a triangular community between a highway and a small 
mountain.402   
 
Ismael Valdés Valdés Civil engineer who was tasked with sketching a new plan for the city and 
worked closely with Carvajal.403 By 1917 Valdés Valdés was claiming the science of urbanism, 
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and in his La tranformación de Santiago, fixated on neighborhoods built from scratch, such as 
Washington, La Plata, and Canberra.404   
 
Luis Muñoz Maluschka Headed the General Law of Construction and Urbanization written as a 
response the 1928 Talca earthquake.405  He was the disciple of Brunner and had a lasting impact 
on planning for several decades, heading various housing and planning organizations. 
 
Alberto Schade Pohlenz In 1928 Alberto he taught a class on urbanismo at the School of 
Architecture of the University of Chile’s Faculty of Economic Sciences and Mathematics with a 
syllabus clearly influenced by Camillo Sitte.406 
 
Karl Brunner von Lehenstein Brunner was hired by the Chilean government in 1929 after the 
Talca earthquake and working there for the next decade407  He inspired Chilean notables such as 
Rodulfo Otarzún Philippi, Luis Muñoz Maluschka, Alberto Mackenna Subercaseaux, and 
Alfredo Prat Echaurren.408   
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Rodulfo Oyarzún Chilean Architect Rodulfo Oyarzún met Karl Brunner in 1927 while studying 
in Vienna, and suggested the Austrian visit his homeland.409 
 
Josué Smith Solar Son of a North American engineer and educated in the U.S., he redesigned 
the public space in front of the Moneda.410  Smith Solar collaborated with José Smith Miller to 
create the campus for the Valparaíso Universidad Federico Santa Maria between 1928 and 
1931.411  
 
Emilio Duhart Earned a master’s degree under the influential modernist Walter Gropius at 
Harvard, and then became the Director of the Institute of Urban and Housing Planning in 
Santiago from 1953 to 1960.412  In 1966 he completed the United Nations CEPAL building in 
Santiago with the assistance Brazilian landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx, a staple of Latin 
American modernism.413  
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Appendix C: Timeline of Housing Laws and Significant Planning Events 
 
1880s Laws Two low-income housing laws were ratified: the first in 1883 offered incentives to 
private investors for the construction of worker housing within the municipality of Santiago, and 
the next in 1888 sought to regulate the conventillos.414  An 1889 law commenced the assembly 
of Patronage Committees tasked with inspecting hygiene, improving worker housing, and 
promoting investment in savingsHidalgo Dattwyler likens this to an earlier Belgian law.415  
 
1888 Directorate of Public Works Undertook major projects like installing a new drainage 
system for Santiago.416  Initiated the ability of the municipal government to build community 
projects. 
 
1891 Law of Autonomous Community Prohibited the construction of ranchos in certain sectors 
of the city, as well as promoted the construction of hygienic dwellings.417  The law dictated 
minimum urbanization qualifications for official incorporation as a neighborhood.418  Hutchinson 
portrays the elite as having coordinated the 1891 Law of Autonomous Community to eliminate 
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the eyesore of the ranchos.  It achieved this by allowing government bodies to purchase areas 
lining the Mopocho River419  
 
1905 Sanitary Convention took place in Santiago and summarized earlier Inter-American 
Conferences of 1897 and 1902, bringing international attention to Chile’s struggle with 
hygiene.420  
 
1906 Law of Worker Housing Created local housing councils made up of “…officials from the 
central government, the municipalities, and the church, in addition to state-appointed 
representatives from worker societies,” the 1906 law also helped make accessible banking and 
credit institutions to the poor.421   
 
1906 Mortgage Credit Fund Initiated with the purpose of providing loans for housing projects.  
Murphy suggests this program eventually excluded the poorest citizens in favor of more lucrative 
and secure middle class residents, in a process eerily reminiscent of redlining in the U.S.422 
 
1908 and 1909 First Pan-American Scientific Conference Santiago hosted the meeting 
covering issues such as sanitation, housing, and physical fitness.423  Spanish planner Soria y 
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Mata was invited to attend the conference but was unable to, instead asking Carvajal to stand in 
and present his writing “Rational City Planning as a Practical Solution to Low Cost Housing,” 
which highlighted the atrocious infant mortality rates in Santiago—it was estimated two thirds of 
newborns died in their first year of life.424  The presentation must have been well received, as 
Carvajal would prove very active going forward in his career.  
 
1910 Centennial celebration Ignited a carousel of projects.  Three new rail stations were 
constructed: the Mapocho, Central, and Pirque Stations.425  Areas like Club Hípico and Cousiño 
Park were given the spotlight, and the Plaza Italia created a new landmark with its statue and 
circular roads.426  The entire renewal plan was championed by the Central Society of 
Architects.427  
 
1915 Transformation Law Mayor Ismael Valdés Vergara pushed for the “transformation law,” 
which gave birth to the Transformation Junta.  It included civil engineer Ismael Valdés Valdés, 
who was tasked with sketching a new plan for the city and worked closely with Carvajal.428  New 
neighborhoods were to be submitted to the board as neatly planned proposals.  The committee 
regulated the heights and sizes of buildings, streets, and parks.429  
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1925 Housing Law, or Decree Law 261 Protected renters from eviction for up to six months, 
giving an opportunity to prove they had met sanitary standards.430  Inspections marked 
conventillos unsanitary, whereby the landlords would be required to reduce the rent by fifty 
percent.431  Walter outlines the February 1925 law: “The law stipulated the establishment of 
housing committees (tribunals de vivienda) made up of representatives of the national and 
municipal governments and the tenant leagues.”432   
 
1925 Renters’ Law Assisted in securing the state’s role in housing, as well as equipping housing 
programs with more regulatory oversight power.433  
 
1925 Law of Affordable Housing, or Law 308  Favored housing cooperatives for the granting 
of credit.  Participants were offered such benefits on a conditional basis, to be revoked if they 
were shown to be partaking in “immoral behavior” such as alcoholism, gambling, prostitution, 
etc.434 This law created the Social Welfare Council, which replaced the 1906 Superior Council as 
the teeth used to enforce housing laws.435 
 
1928 Law of General Urbanization and Construction The 1928 earthquake in Talca furthered 
the burgeoning interest in planning, as law 4,563 of 1931 required that “…every city with a 
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population over 20,000 must develop a General Transformation Plan.”436  The law established 
nationwide urban standards, for example, for the widths of streets and the heights of homes.437  
The 1931 Urban Development and Construction General Law also spawned the Central Board of 
Popular Housing, which in 1936 was rebranded as the Popular Housing Fund or CORHABIT, 
and offered loans with twenty-seven year terms and initial payment of mortgages.438   
 
1931 Law 4931 created the Popular Housing Junta to collaborate with the Social Welfare 
Superior Council, which had been operating since the 1926 Affordable Housing Law.439  In 
March, Decree with Legal Force No. 33 replaced the Junta de Habitación Popular with the 
Popular Housing Central Junta, composed of representatives of several housing organizations, 
which had access to the Mortgage Credit Fund.440  The president of the republic was to set the 
maximum price for land values in the cities of Santiago, Valparaíso, Antofagasta, and Iquique.441   
 
1932 Decree Law No. 402 The 1932 Housing Departmentfashioned by the Decreto Ley No. 
402, which enforced the 1931 Decree with Legal Force No. 33was composed of five sections: 
Technique, Juridical, Mining and Exploitation, Social Economy, and Administration.442  This 
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organization undertook all construction duties, which were transferred from the Public Works 
Department.443  
 
1931 National Institute of Urbanism was formed to continue with the principles of scientific 
urbanism, as outlined by Brunner.444  The Institute initiated the General Law of Buildings and 
Urban Developments, which was combined with various other laws intended to assist the poor 
and regulate urban growth.445   
 
1936 Law 5950 Championed by the Senator Alejandro Lira Infante, enacted the Popular 
Housing Fund or CORHABIT.446  It was anticipated to supply 1 billion escudos for 166 thousand 
houses and a median value of 15 thousand escudos.  With five people per family, the program 
was to benefit some 333 thousand people.447  
 
1935 Law 5579 Dictated that the President could issue plots in the name of the Housing 
Department, “las mejoras” or “arrendamiento a piso,” effectively self-help plots.448  The 
President regulated prices and guaranteed documents; “compraventa de sitios a plazo” (trading of 
term sites), allowed people for the trading in of false documents.449  
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1943 Law 7,600 Restructured the way CORHABIT was funded.  Required that companies build 
a minimum amount of worker housing proportional to profit.450  Through this law taxes were 
levied on inheritance, legacies, and donations.451  
 
1944 Ordinance of Urbanization and Affordable Constructions stipulated exact measurement 
standards for affordable housing: structures were to be placed on surfaces of between 36 and 100 
meters squared, as to support a multitude of housing typologies.452  The law regulated the 
minimum space between homes, the maximum height of buildings and number of floors, as well 
as minimum light and ventilation.  Communities were required to be linked to potable water, 
sewage, public lighting, and industrial energy and gas.  Neighborhood designs were required to 
include communal spaces and sufficient spacing and density.453   
 
1948 Pereira Law Was intended to stimulate housing construction via state-backed 
mortgages.454  Specifically geared toward the middle class. 
 
1958 Santiago Intercommunal Regulatory Plan “…laid out the master plan for the city facing 
challenges of metropolization.”455  The capital’s multiple municipalities were expected to benefit 
                                                     
450 Murphy, For a Proper Home, 61. 
451 Policy makers explicitly aimed to tax mine owners and chip off a piece of the most lucrative 
industry in the country, but this manner of tax reform, ironically, appears directed at the 
aristocratic landlords who would keep money within the nation and pass it through inherence, 
see Hidalgo Dattwyler, “El papel de las leyes de fomento de la edificación obrera,”  
452 Ibid. 
453 Ibid. 
454 “Historia del ministerio de urbanismo y vivienda”; Murphy, For a Proper Home, 62. 
455 Pérez Oyarzún, “Chile,” in Latin America in Construction, 159. 
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from the coordinated uniform plan, and citizens were used to the idea of inter-communal 
planning, which it was assumed would offer infrastructure and public services to disconnected 
regions.   
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